# THEOLOGY

## A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF HISTORIC CHRISTIANITY

EDITED BY E. G. SELWYN, B.D.

Vol. X. JANUARY, 1925 No. 55.

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LONDON — Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

S.P.C.K. HOUSE, NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, W.C.

1s. net per copy; 12s. net per annum, post free.

v.10-11 1925

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*MONTHLY*, **1s.** *net. SUBSCRIPTION*, **12s.** *net per annum, post free.*
*HALF-YEARLY VOLUMES, cloth boards,* **10s.** *net each.*

**(Vols. I.–VIII.; Vol. IX., July to December, 1924)**

**Cases may be had from S.P.C.K. at 1s. 6d. each. Back numbers can be obtained at 1s. each postage extra.**

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# THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the Rev. E. G. Selwyn, M.A., Redhill Rectory, Havant, to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

Vol. X JANUARY, 1925 No. 55

## EDITORIAL

### THE BISHOP OF PRETORIA'S CHALLENGE

Anglo-Catholicism has been experiencing rough water lately—rougher water, we venture to say, than it has known for many a long year. To many of us this is not surprising. So long as the movement was persecuted and yet could vindicate itself (as it did) in law, in scholarship, and in pastoral work, the issues raised were relatively clear, and the lines of policy well marked. But those days are past, and have been succeeded by an age of tolerance, so far as administrative action is concerned. The Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline in 1906 may perhaps be regarded as the turning-point; for it recognized that the progress of religion and thought in the Church of England had overleapt the limits of the existing formularies, and that this was, in large measure, inevitable. The more far-seeing have realized that the new situation would prove a testing-time for the Catholic movement. And the question was, and is: What will the movement do with its freedom and opportunity?

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The removal of legal pressures made it fairly clear that the future issues of the movement would have to be fought out on the field of theology; and any doubt on that score is dispelled by recent controversy in the columns of the *Church Times*. We say controversy rather than controversies, because, though the Bishops of Pretoria and of Birmingham write from quite different standpoints, they both deal primarily with the Catholic movement; and not only with the Catholic movement, but with its theology; and not only with its theology, but with the relation of its theology to Modernism. Both supply evidence to the fact that the Catholic movement was not the only one that was knocking at the door, when, in 1906, the Royal Commission decided that it ought to be opened wider: there was the Modernist



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movement as well. And if the Modernist movement achieves nothing else, it will at least compel Anglo-Catholicism, at all costs, to face the theological issues, not of its own position merely, but of Supernatural Religion as a whole in the world of to-day.

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That was the real point of the Bishop of Pretoria's challenge published in the *Church Times* of November 21; and we say at once that we thank him for it. It contained much with which we disagree, as we shall make plain in the sequel. It started a number of false hares, which have been hunted irrelevantly ever since. One such was the notion that the preacher of the sermon which induced the Bishop of Pretoria to utter his challenge was being "personally attacked." Nothing could be wider of the mark: opinions published in a printed sermon are a perfectly legitimate subject of criticism. Nothing could be more disastrous to the cause of truth, or to the reputation of theology as a science than the idea that such criticism is personal. The Bishop of Pretoria was concerned with beliefs and arguments on their merits, irrespective of whose they were; and our own concern is the same.

The real *gravamen* of the Bishop's charge is that a sermon, published in the *Church Times* under the heading of "The Anglo-Catholic Pulpit," represented an attitude to historical truth which is foreign to the whole mind of the Church of England and inconsistent with any rational theology.

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The *Church Times* suggested (November 21, 1924) that the observance of the Feast of the Falling Asleep of the Blessed Virgin Mary was of more consequence than the reasoning by which such observance may be encouraged, or the beliefs on which it rests. We do not think that they can have fully weighed the logical issues of that contention. The present writer would think his prayers incomplete if they did not contain the salutation of Mary; but he cannot conceive the need of further ground for this than that she was the Mother of the Lord. Otherwise, what the critical mind at once says is this: "If that is the way in which Christians to-day arrive at the belief in the 'resurrection' and 'exaltation' of Mary, is it not reasonable to suppose that the Christians of the first century arrived by similar methods at belief in the Resurrection and Ascension of our Lord?" In other words, it simply destroys the defences of the Faith against Modernism. It provides Modernists with contemporary examples of precisely that legendary tendency in the mind of the Church which they postulate, to account for

—and explain away—the evidence in the New Testament. That is the last result which the preacher could have desired; but in a Church which is in touch with modern knowledge and thought it is inevitable. The vindication of the historical element in our Faith depends in the last resort on the trustworthiness of the testimony from which it is derived: let that be seriously shaken, and we are left—not with nothing, but with something very different. In so far as Revelation involves statements of a philosophical or historical character, it invites the application of philosophical and historical canons of criticism; and only when it does that can the Church hope to convince the educated people of each generation. We do not abandon Reason when we embrace Faith.

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The great contribution which *Lux Mundi* made to Anglican theology was its insistence on that fact. They went with Reason all the way, and claimed that it pointed to, and indicated, Faith. They claimed and exercised a complete liberty in examining all its credentials. In the matter of the completeness, or otherwise, of our Lord's knowledge while He was on earth, they followed the evidence, at the cost of causing pain to one whom they greatly revered. And let no one suppose that Anglo-Catholic theologians of to-day have any intention of going back upon the freedom thus asserted. We cannot do it. When Dr. Gore writes:

> I have, ever since I was an undergraduate, been certain that I must be in the true sense a free thinker, and that either not to think freely about a disturbing subject, or to accept ecclesiastical authority in place of the best judgment of my own reason, would for me be an impossible treason against the light. . . .

he is only saying what Newman in a famous epigram said of himself; and he is avowing a frame of mind which, as the Bishop of Pretoria says, is "morally resonant" in its courage, its candour, and its love of truth.

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Since *Lux Mundi* was written, both the Catholic movement and the Critical movement have proceeded apace, and have necessitated new methods of apologetic. Bishop Gore's recent books on "The Reconstruction of Belief" explicitly recognize the fact; while they meet it chiefly by the incorporation of new material, and the discussion of new problems in a structure of thought essentially unchanged. More far-reaching in method is the work of the school which starts from the relation of

theology to religious experience. The Bishop of Manchester, in his recently published *Christus Veritas*, regards religious experience as the keystone of the arch on which the intellectual defence of Theism must rest. If report be credited, a recent series of Bampton Lectures at Oxford handled the Doctrine of the Fall from this standpoint, and with entire acceptance of the modern outlook on the early chapters of Genesis. The same approach is to be found in Mr. Rawlinson's *Dogma, Fact, and Experience*, and his Paddock Lectures, and in Mr. Spens's *Belief and Practice*. We publish an article to-day from his pen, which affords a brief illustration of the method.

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The main object of the last named is the construction of a doctrine of Authority upon the basis of religious experience. This last is understood in the broad sense on which Dr. Temple insisted in the third chapter of his *Christus Veritas;* and Catholicism, with its long, continuous history, gathering up the spiritual life of diverse races and ages, presents us with a system in which this experience finds unrivalled expression. One of the most arresting features of this Church-system is the unity and coherence of its dogmatic structure. Yet, for that very reason, it invites analysis; and such analysis reveals within the structure what we may call different *strata* of belief, different emphases and points of tension, different relations between belief and experience, which are not obvious at first sight. Take, for example, the three doctrines of the Fall, of Christ suffering under Pontius Pilate, and of His Ascension. All alike are taught authoritatively in the Church. Yet they differ. The first of these has never been, like the other two, the subject of dogmatic definition, and would for that reason be considered by some as having a smaller degree of authority. They differ again in their rational grounds. The first rests wholly upon religious experience; the second wholly upon historical testimony; while the third rests in part upon both, though chiefly upon the first. And the tendency is to allow the fullest latitude to this distinction. "The irreducible element," says Mr. Spens, "in any doctrine lies . . . in the capacity which it has displayed as a guide to experience." That is the permanent and primary value of dogma. Its historical truth, if it impinges upon history at all, must be verified by the recognized methods of historical enquiry.

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We believe that there is more affinity than is sometimes supposed between this apologetic and that which we connect with the names of Dr. Gore and Canon Scott Holland. Dr. Gore reposes an immense superstructure of faith upon the religious

experience of the prophets; Canon Holland found in reason the organ of spiritual insight.* The development of their work involves for us to-day an extension of study and criticism beyond the religious experience of the prophets and the apostolic writers (which still remains normative) to that of the whole spiritual life of Christendom; and no less a claim of autonomy for reason, especially in the fields of Psychology, History, and Comparative Religion. The position asserted—and it is a typically Anglican position—is not that a thing is true because the Church teaches it, but that the Church teaches it because it is true.

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So far we do not doubt that the Bishop of Pretoria is with us; and the measure in which theological principles and methods of this kind are embraced and followed in the Catholic movement will afford the measure of its immunity from strictures like those recently passed by the Bishop of Birmingham. We do not propose to comment upon his actions: they were justly and temperately dealt with in a leading article in the *Guardian* of December 5. But we would appeal to Anglo-Catholics generally not to provide assailants with precisely the grounds they need for attacking the movement as a whole, and through it the Faith itself. There will always be in the movement those who maximize and those who minimize the element of authority in religious belief; and it is vital that the two points of view should constantly interact with one another. But neither of them has room for obscurantism. That is to expose a great cause to disastrous misunderstanding, and, if persisted in, must shatter it in pieces.

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It is time now, however, to deal with other aspects of the Bishop of Pretoria's challenge. The first is the application of the principle of historical honesty to matters liturgical. We are not concerned here with matters of devotional detail, which are being thoroughly examined in the Church Assembly. But we are very much concerned with the Bishop's use of his principle, for it seems to us to lead straight to the arid wastes of Liberal Protestantism. His objections to allusions to Job or to the Three Children or to "polygamous Jewish patriarchs" savour of an intellectual Puritanism which cannot by any means be reconciled with the rich and warm Catholicism he has so eloquently described. As Canon Stuckey Coles has admirably pointed out (*Church Times*, December 5, 1924), these things belong to the classical literature of Christendom, and the value

* *Cf.* Canon Richmond's paper on "Dr. Holland's Philosophy of Faith," in *C.Q.R.*, July, 1924

of their lessons is unaffected, whether we regard them as history or as parable. They are the folk-lore of an uniquely inspired people, and are superbly adapted for the purposes of devotion. But there is more to be said even than this. The polygamy of the Jewish patriarchs is just the kind of fact about them which the Liberal Protestant thinks important; he believes that, when he has pointed that out, he has disencumbered Christian thought of an incubus. But no Catholic Christian was ever worried about their polygamy, even if he stopped to notice it. What he does see in these dim figures of ancient tradition is powerful examples of *Men of God*. They are men of "numinous" character. They see a gleam and they follow it, sometimes at heroic cost. What matters about Jacob was not the number of his wives, but that "he dreamed, and behold a ladder . . . and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it"; and that "there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day." And these experiences are of equal value whether they belong to a historical Jacob or to someone else of the same, or of a different, name. But in truth we do not really think that the Bishop of Pretoria would quarrel with this. We prefer to believe that a touch of rhetoric betrayed him.

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The second point has been raised by Lord Halifax (*Church Times*, December 5, 1924). It is the issue of Reunion with the Holy See. We regret greatly to appear to dissent from one whose life and work have been so fraught with blessing, both to the Church of England and to the cause of Reunion; and it is possible that dissent is not the word which should be used. But the interests of Reunion are so often impleaded in current discussion that we sorely need some clear speaking. The plea is entered in regard both to practice and to belief: and in both cases we believe that incidentally great injustice is done to the Church of Rome. It is said, for instance, that the adoption in the English Church of customs like Communion in one kind will facilitate Catholic Reunion. That is not only to impute to Rome a smallness which on great issues of policy it has rarely shown; it is also to imply a conception of Catholic jurisdiction which there is no possibility of Anglicans ever coming to accept. We stand here entirely with the Eastern Churches; and there can be no Reunion for us, any more than for them, except on terms of the widest administrative autonomy for national—and probably also denominational—churches. Nor do we believe that the best Roman Catholic opinion would say otherwise.

The question of belief is more complex: but we may outline it in this way. It is a question of our attitude to Truth. The

English Church stands for liberty of research and criticism within the Church, and insists that doctrinal agreement is only impressive if it is free; and to go back on that claim would be treason to its own soul. Sorry indeed would be our contribution to Reunion, if we left behind that element in our heritage which is most precious and most distinctive—its fearlessness in scholarship, its boldness in facing risks and consequences, its passion for seeing all sides of a problem, its reserve and caution in drawing conclusions. And, let it be said at once—Rome is not so rigid and so uniform as some think. Only recently the French Jesuit, Père de la Taille, and the American Roman Catholic, Bishop Macdonald, have put forward teaching on the Eucharistic Sacrifice, which admits all that Anglican divines have ever claimed for the "one perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction" made by our Lord upon the Cross; and readers of *Blackfriars* will be aware of the flutter thus caused in some of the dove-cotes of Roman Catholic theology nearer home. Roman theology in its long history has exhibited astonishing revolutions in its attitude to truth; and we may well hope that they no less than we realize how much each still has to learn.

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But this is only to increase the sense of responsibility and of opportunity for the purity of our own witness in the English Church at this time. Rarely can Theology have had more obstacles to encounter. Smothered under academic or parochial duties, beset by committees, conferences, or councils, forced into journalism when its proper work is study, honoured in word and often honorary in deed, her life is indeed a precarious one. Far indeed from present realities seems the ideal of Plato's theologian, who "keeps quiet and confines himself to his own concerns, like one who takes shelter behind a wall on a stormy day, when the wind is driving before it a hurricane of dust and rain."* Nevertheless, our duty to truth stands sure. We can still keep our faces to the light. We can still cultivate these qualities of Understanding and Goodwill and Candour which Plato reckons necessary in any who would test the life and health of a soul.† And it is Theology's task so to test the soul of the Church of England, whether it be "living rightly or not." We do not suppose that the present crisis—for such it is—will be over in a moment. But equally we do not doubt that Catholic Christianity in the Church of England will emerge strengthened, because purified, from the process; and that the solution of its problems here will react beneficially both upon Constantinople and upon Rome.

* *Republic*, 496 D.

† *Gorgias*, 487 A.

# THE AUTHORITY OF PERSONAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE*

With the growing modern interest in the mystical aspect of religion, the ever-increasing attention to, and discussion of, individual spiritual experience, the problem of the degree of authority we should attribute to such experience becomes pressing for all students of theology. The claim to a first-hand knowledge of God is as old as man's religious consciousness. Is it ever a valid claim? And if so, what are the tests and limitations we should apply to it? This question is tantamount to an enquiry into the extent in which the personal spiritual life of the individual depends on and takes its sanctions from his own inner light. It leads to a further question, as to the authority of those who claim to speak, or seem to speak, from an unusually full, vivid, and direct spiritual experience; that is to say, the mystics. Are we to accept at its face value, and act upon, all that they tell us? How much attention ought we to pay to these sources of information about the spiritual world? What checks and safeguards ought we to employ in respect of them? How are we to distinguish the lunatic from the visionary? And when it comes to the problem of private judgment, how are we to distinguish the hysteric from the saint? How, in ourselves, are we going to decide between the results of mental prayer and of auto-suggestion?

Some months ago a lady was introduced to me who opened the conversation in these terms: "My dear Miss Underhill, I do so want to tell you that I always keep your dear books on a table by my bed; and I don't know whether it is your dear books, or whether it is my soft white bed, but directly I lie down I do have the most wonderful illuminations from the Absolute!" That lady put in a nutshell the difficulties in deciding the degree of first-hand authority attaching to mystical experience. How much of that experience is due to the dear books—all the suggestions and all the images derived from tradition and literature? How much is due to the soft white bed—suitable and protective religious environment? Is the religious individualist, even the individualist of genius, ever quite so individual and unsupported as he thinks? Is a pure experience ever possible to him at all; or must there always be in it a subjective element, an interpretative activity of the mind—a mind which has been fed by literature and dogma? Does "the flight of the Alone to the Alone" ever really take place?

* Paper read before the Conference of the Anglican Fellowship, Oxford, July, 1924.

This discrimination of personal experience from tradition and environment is by no means so easy as it appears at first sight to eager admirers of the mystics. I doubt whether it is ever perfectly achieved even by the onlooker; certainly never by the experient. Take up St. Augustine's *Confessions:* a book which brings the problem before us in an acute form, owing to the distinct claim made in it to first-hand experience, and the enormous influence it exercised on later generations. Consider what that book would have been like, indeed what St. Augustine's spiritual experience would have been like, if he had not read Plotinus. Do or do not those marvellous passages in which he is using Plotinian language and ideas bring to the Christian Church authoritative information about Augustine's own experience of God? Did Plotinus give him more than a formula by which his real and immediate apprehensions could be reduced to literary form? Did not the suggestive influence of the Plotinian books affect the actual experience as well? Above and beyond this, consider the Christian atmosphere in which St. Augustine lived: first the presence and anxious love of St. Monica, then the immense prestige of St. Ambrose; finally the liturgic influences of the Church—of course, enormously increased after he entered the priesthood. Have we not here the soft white bed? Before we can say definitely what first-hand news of spiritual realities Augustine brings to us, we have to subtract all this. We have to decide what the mystical experience of a bookless Augustine on a desert island would have been like. All the rest may, for other reasons, carry authority for us; but not the authority of immediate experience.

When we come to the mystics of the Middle Ages, on whom St. Augustine's own influence was paramount, the problem becomes even more acute; and ever more and more acute with the addition of each great constructive mind to the roll of the mystics of the Church. The pile of books gets bigger and bigger, and the soft white bed gets softer and softer. The surroundings of the cloister, the growing mass of mystical literature, envelope the individual with an ever more favouring atmosphere. He enters a spiritual tradition which has come to be accepted *en bloc* by all contemplative minds; and its influence on him is necessarily great. How much, then, of his total experience represents illuminations from the Absolute, first-hand and uncoloured intercourse with God? Certainly far less than earlier students supposed. We are perpetually identifying more and more of the significant sayings of the mystics; and, tracing them to their source, finding new truth in the saying that "behind every saint stands another saint." Even the most eccentric and individual among them, such as Boehme, Fox, or

Blake, even the most impassioned proclaimers of the uniqueness of their own inner light—these, too, when we really look into it, have the dear books and the soft white bed. At the very least they are all soaked in the Bible, which provides them with a constant stream of suggestive imagery; and generally, beyond this, have a considerable literary ancestry, which careful study has more and more unveiled to us. They cannot be isolated. Boehme received food from the earlier German mystics and the hermetic literature of the Renaissance period; Blake, from Swedenborg and the Quietists; Fox, from the innumerable experimenters who had preceded him.

All this seems at first sight very disconcerting. We are tempted to explain every apparent experience in terms of the working out of tradition and environment. Yet, on the other hand, we must remember that originally somebody wrote those dear books. Somehow and somewhere, these vivid accounts of spiritual experience did begin: they entered human history through a human consciousness—the only way, of course, in which revelation can come—and, traced to their source, possess this degree of first-hand authority. If we believe that the channels of revelation still remain open, then we must believe that the authoritative news of God which did come once can still come to us through those channels; and our problem becomes the problem of deciding on the marks by which we should recognize it.

Two such marks are surely of signal importance: (1) Consensus of witness; (2) life-giving power. That is, our view of the authority attaching to mystical experience cannot be arrived at without considering (*a*) the comparison of any one message with the general religious sense of the Church; (*b*) the whole of the life into which that message came. On a lower level, the authority of every individual experience can be measured by the same rules.

I. We cannot accept as authoritative any experience which isolates the experient; cuts him out of his social or historical background. The truth must come to fulfil and not to destroy. This really amounts to the same thing as the classic test proposed by Richard of St. Victor in the well-known saying: "I will not believe I see Christ transfigured, unless Moses and Elias [that is to say, the moral law and the traditional revelation] are with Him." This at once rules out the eccentric and illuminist, and brings us into the presence of the sober realism of the saints; with their interest in conduct, their perpetual demand for purification, their willing use of traditional formulæ. It reminds us how one and all of them have acknowledged tests to be necessary, how deeply they felt the uniformity of the action of the

Spirit of God, how much they distrusted and disliked the bizarre and sensational: as in their constant warnings against psychophysical phenomena being confused with spiritual experiences, or the blunt reminder of St. John of the Cross that many persons say God has spoken to them, when they have only been talking to themselves. We see, too, how all supposed experience which the general good sense of Christendom does not endorse has failed in the past to be influential. Montanism, founded on the unbridled claim to a personal ecstatic experience, soon died away. The special revelation of the Abbot Joachim failed in the end to find acceptance. The undisciplined illuminism of the Brothers of the Free Spirit merely led to degeneracy, and in the end even to immorality. The cause in all these cases seems to have been a lack of sobriety, an absence of the true historical sense: Moses and Elias do not run to meet any of these supposed transfigured souls. Individual experience, then, only becomes authoritative when emerging from and backed up by the corporate experience. It must form one strand in the whole rich life of the religious body. Any effort at undue simplification of this life, at creating an opposition between the religion of authority and the religion of the spirit, becomes in the end destructive of both.

As a matter of fact, the consensus of witness which does exist amongst all the most solid of the mystics and contemplatives is remarkable. As we become intimate with them, the conviction deepens that they do all experience in different ways and degrees one and the same reality. We need not even limit this statement to Christians. All experimental theists have something in common. Their experiences may differ, but do not rule each other out. Though many of them may, and indeed often do, rebel against religious formalism, they are seldom hostile to the great outlines of religious doctrine. Even the very greatest contemplatives—such as Ruysbroeck, who seemed to carry human apprehension far beyond the horizons of the common mind—yet begin with the simplest essentials, the ordinary ways both of morality and belief: and they carry these up with them in their flights, they do not leave them behind.

II. In addition to this, genuine spiritual experience transforms those who receive it; and it cannot be regarded as authoritative unless it does this. In theological language, it is a sanctifying grace. It is guaranteed by its life-giving power: and if found to possess this life-giving power, however much in it may seem due to tradition or fostered by environment, we may and ought to acknowledge its genuineness and authority. Thus St. Augustine's use of Plotinian language does not discredit

his experience. He used it because it best expressed that which he was trying to say. Under the influence of the experience which he tries to describe to us he became, like St. Francis at his conversion, another man; and the mere result of suggestion and imagination does not so transform. Here Augustine is particularly valuable to us; because we seem to have in him both the result of traditional suggestion and the result of genuine experience traditionally expressed. Thus he tells us that when he was trying to find Divine Reality through the study of the Platonic books, his state was that of one who looks from a wooded height at the land of peace, but does not see the road thereto. He says of his achievement of the Platonic ecstasy: "With the flash of a hurried glance I attained . . . but I could not *sustain* my gaze": for this experience was directly induced by books. It did not do for him; it had not authority for life. I think, to a limited extent, we may even say the same of the celebrated experience at Ostia, where he sits with St. Monica by the window, and their thoughts for a moment touch the Eternal Truth. That is a very beautiful, but surely, with its direct dependence on Plotinus, a very literary scene. But the profound and penetrating consciousness of God to which he had come after nine years of full and costly Christian life, in which moral and intellectual tensions were completely maintained, was of a very different kind. When he exclaims: "I tossed upon the wave, and Thou didst steer. . . . What can I say, my God, my holy joy? What can any man say when he speaks of Thee?" —*that* is not borrowed from books; nor was the exacting and selfless life Augustine was living at this time supported by a book-fed spirituality. So, too, with St. Paul. Not his Rabbinical knowledge, not his ecstatic revelations and visionary experience, but the consciousness of a Power in which he could do all things, and the fact that he actually *did* the things, guarantee the first-hand character and authority of his experience.

Again, consider the First Isaiah; from whom we have what is perhaps one of the most marvellous accounts of a human soul's direct contact with transcendent reality. His experience is guaranteed by the fact that it did not merely give him private information, but made him an actual source of authority for those to whom he prophesied. More than this, his personal record added something new to the whole Jewish-Christian tradition.

Even in the brief account which we possess of it, we can distinguish certain characteristics. In the first place the experience, though absolutely individual and soul-piercing, was not dissociated from the historical and institutional environment

into which Isaiah was born. The place of his enlightenment was the seat of his national cultus. The time was connected with national events. It was " the year in which King Uzziah died." The symbols under which an imageless Reality was mediated to him were of a familiar kind: the " glory of the Lord " and attendant seraphim. But transfusing all this, and not to be evoked—though doubtless it is to be interpreted—by the suggestions inherent in traditional material, are the unmeasured awe and adoration of the seraphim, the profound abasement of the human creature brought within the radius of perfect Holiness and Power. The authority of Isaiah's experience, for himself and also for those capable of feeling its quality, centres upon this recognition of a supernatural atmosphere, and is further guaranteed by its results. Those results were practical, and decisive for Isaiah's life. " Whom shall we send ? " and the immediate answer, " Send *me !*"

Now the experience of God which has true authority is, I believe, in the long run always a vocational experience. It always impels to some sort of service: always awakens an energetic love. It never leaves the self where it found it. It forces the experient to try and do hard things. It says to St. Augustine, " Take and read," and presently compels the apparent sacrifice of his whole worldly career. It says to Suso, " Be a man," and leads him to the Upper School of Resignation. It asks of Pascal " a total yet a sweet renunciation." The language, the tradition, and the symbol through which such a dynamic experience comes have little importance. They are *media*. The point is that the effects are vital. Had the lady who first set this problem for us felt compelled to reduce the hours which she spent in that soft white bed; better still, had she been hauled out of it to kneel on the hard floor; then, we might have felt more certitude about the authority of her visions of the Absolute.

So we come to this. The person whose experience we may consider authoritative is one for whom vision and surrender are one thing, and a dynamic thing—the person who is forced to exclaim, " Send me !" Those to whom this happens never doubt the reality of the sanctions under which they are acting. They are sure that a real coal off a real altar has touched their lips. The modern French contemplative, Lucie Christine, says of her own first plunge into direct mystical experience, " My soul opened and drank in God, and He was to me a light, an attraction, and a power." That is to say, a source of more vision, more love, and more energy. Vision without love-impelled action should always be held suspect. Sudden and fleeting glimpses may well be imaginary; we have at least no

test by which to decide whether they are or not. But we are bound to feel more respect for those solid certitudes which are crowned by a life of sacrifice. The real words of God, said another modern saint, always *do* what they say. They must leave the soul other than that which they found it. Thus the guarantee that Isaiah's experience was not compounded of unsteady nerves and a vivid imagination is the subsequent career of Isaiah himself. The guarantee that the Voice which said to St. Francis, " Repair My Church," had its origin beyond the saint's subconscious mind—though this doubtless provided the formula—is again the heroic and life-giving life of Francis himself. So, too, the first mystical experiences of Angela of Foligno forced her to a long penance and education; and it was through this that she reached that level of experience and truth, that vivid certitude, which turned a middle-aged widow living in seclusion in a small Italian town into a powerful spiritual personality, a mother of saints. This ultimate stage of creativeness and not the strangeness of her visions is the guarantee of Angela's experience.

All the mighty figures of our religious history possess in a certain degree this definite creative quality, a winning and yet awe-inspiring authority of their own; and, traced back, we find this always originates in a personal and first-hand experience of spiritual realities, a genuine contact with and surrender to a supernatural and more living world. These people bring into human life something which neither virtuous living nor tradition nor philosophy alone can produce; something other than the natural or the rational, something which is entirely given, yet in being received involves the experient in costly obligations. They alone can truly assure us of spiritual realities, because they are themselves living the life of the spirit. Theirs is the authority of experience; and—whatever their level of apprehension or expression may be—it is in essence the same as the authority of the mystics and the saints. And this authority of the saints, living and dead, is an authority not of information but of personality. They may not know more than other men, but they *are* more than other men. Few people are so unfortunate as to pass through life without once coming into touch with sanctity; and sanctity is unequalled in its power of making all who meet it sure about the spiritual world. There we touch the real authority of personal experience. The saints themselves possess a certitude past argument. It may be one they are wholly unable to express adequately; yet they can often convey it under the crudest, and even apparently most absurd, forms. When we meet it, it compels our assent; for the reaction of the soul to sanctity is an all-or-none reaction. We may want to

heckle theologians; but we never want to heckle saints. Moreover, the testimony of the saints invariably obeys the rule of Richard of St. Victor, in that it does corroborate the Scriptures; and it does this just because the New Testament is so largely the record of a personal experience of God, which has been repeated again and again. It is impossible to draw a line at the end of the Apocalypse and say, here direct revelation through personality comes to an end. As a matter of fact the saints not only say, but show, that St. Paul's loftiest declarations describe things that will always happen if the conditions are right. Thus there really is a sense in which it is true to say that there exists an inner church of prophecy and vision, often ministering in very odd places, and through extremely odd men; and this is the Church that possesses the direct authority of experience.

Turn now from the authority wielded by the personal experience of the real saint or the mystic, to the authority which we ought to attribute to the limited experiences of ordinary men—the general participation in the inner light claimed by the Quakers, for instance, and regarded by them as authoritative. We cannot dissociate these claims; for both the claim of the specialist and the claim of the ordinary man must rest on a certain identity existing between them. If the spiritual landscape of the mystic were wholly other than our own, if he had a supernatural life and we had none at all, then he would have no value and meaning for us. We could not understand his declarations: they could not thrill us as they do with admiration and desire, if our small vague experience were not, so far as it goes, a bit of the one Reality, and due, as Von Hügel insists, to a "real presence and operation of the Infinite and of God in all men." If our limited apprehension be not endorsed by the declarations of those great explorers, then we are left without a clue, and are placed outside the Communion of Saints. But if the mystics' contemplation of God represents the full expansion of a power latent in all, if it is just the higher term of the normal experiences of recollective prayer, then the whole inquiry into the mystical faculty and its authority becomes highly significant for us.

As a matter of fact, is not this what happens? As men progress in the inner life so, bit by bit, do they not find that the declarations of the saints in respect of it do answer to experience, and do work out right? And on this account they become more and more willing to accept those declarations about truths still beyond the horizon of the natural mind. Most people, and in the beginning all people, accept the supernatural, if they accept it at all, simply on authority. But they do this because of the prevenient authority of the Spirit within themselves;

only because of a dim sense of the supernatural existing within us, can we ever recognize the accent of the supernatural in the seer or the saint. In all rich and full religious lives, and even in those which make the most use of tradition, this primary personal experience must have a place. Those who are quite spiritually insensitive do not really accept the authority based on experience at all. In consequence of this, they do not get all that the authority of institution and tradition should be able to give them; for they do not detect any inside to it. But any man or woman who has genuine experience of the inner life, and sufficient humility to realize the very low place most of us occupy on the great ladder of prayer, will, when they have found their place on that ladder, find that the advice of the mystics in respect of it always works. Those mystics are the true seat of authority for the conduct of the inner life, though not necessarily for anything else; for we must always be careful to distinguish their accounts of spiritual experience from the explanations which they offer about it.

Having reached this point, we have got a touchstone for the worth and authority of our own mystical impressions, if we ever have them. These impressions must agree in a general sense with the mind of the Church as to conduct and belief—Moses and Elias—and, so far as they go, must also agree in a general sense with the drift of the teaching of the mystics, and must impel to something equivalent to their dispositions of soul: loving, humble, awed. They must produce, or tend towards, a genuine spiritualization of the self. They must give a wish to work and endure; and never a feeling that the experient knows more about Reality than other people. A fretful disgust with tradition or an impatience with current institutions is always suspicious. It belongs more often to the shallows than the deeps of the spiritual life; and leads to an impossible demand for simplification, an extreme individualism, a disregard for social values, which starve the soul.

To sum up. Man receives authoritative news of the spiritual world through more than one channel, and must react to that world in more than one way if he is not to cramp his soul. We are social *and* solitary, historical *and* eternal creatures. There is no single seat of authority in religion; we climb to reality by a rope of many strands, each giving strength to the rest. Christianity, at once so historical, so institutional, and so mystical, emphasizes this. All these media of God's communication to man possess authority; and each must be checked by the rest. Moreover, uncriticized personal experience, governed as it is by apperception, gives us certitude rather than fact. We find an implicit recognition of this in the greatest contemplative saints;

and neglect of it leads to heresy and fanaticism. Under analysis even the purest personal experience of God turns out to be a compound—the mind which goes to His encounter is not, and cannot be, a blank sheet. Therefore the fact that the experience is presented in traditional terms does limit, but does not discredit it: it must have *some* conceptual clothes. It is better to accept this human necessity than to demand a wholly impossible escape from our own minds. Yet, accepting, we should still remember the distinction between the dim yet vivid contact of the soul with spiritual reality, and the more or less symbolic formula under which it is apprehended: for this formula may be modified, or even lose all value for us, as time goes on—yet its departure may leave the supernatural content unimpaired. This content—the finding and feeling of the Infinite—is unmistakable when it happens, and has authority for life; and it is here that the consensus of the mystics is most impressive. They compel us to admit that they touch profound mysteries we cannot guess at, yet they do this most often by way of a deeper entrance into, a more profound interpretation of, the raw material of the corporate religious life; which supports and transfuses them, and which they take with them in their ascent to God. But the greater the soul, the less this subjective aspect of its experience should disturb us; for into this, too, the supernatural, which is everywhere present, will necessarily enter more and more. We rightfully attribute authority to any source of information about God which tells us real news about Him, or evokes our generally dormant spiritual sense. If it does this He is in it—for only the Infinite can evoke the soul's thirst for the Infinite—" Thou art the Love wherewith the soul loves Thee."

Pondering this, we reach a point where the distinction between the form and the content of spiritual experience almost seems to cease—when the soul, as an old mystic boldly expressed it, " sees neither God nor herself, nor she knows but Him, nor she loves but Him, nor she praises but Him, for there *is* but He." Such a level of divination has seldom been achieved by human consciousness; and in its absolute perfection only once. We sometimes forget that it is on the authority of our Lord's experience of the Father that the whole Christian Church is built; that this experience included not only intuitions, but also events; and that in the culmination of His threefold promise of prayer the authority of individual experience is guaranteed. Knock, and it shall be opened. This is revelation. In it God goes beyond our groping experiences, and fills up the creature's capacity for the Infinite to the brim. The authority of such revelation is always found overwhelming by those who are touched by it; and their response is awe as well as delight.

Last, we must hold, as against all Quietism, that the authoritative experience of God, individual *or* corporate, is ever the experience of an Energy which both stimulates and attracts; and which evokes in us a lesser energy and response. The authority of the mystics, of the Church, or of tradition, is always found to be the authority of a person or a group which has experienced this; which has tasted and been quickened by Eternal Life. All, under an immense variety of symbolic expression, witness to one thing: the universal presence of this supernal energy and love. When our personal and interior experience heightens our appreciation of this corporate experience—sacramental or other—teaches us to discern more and more of the inward in the outward—convinces us of God: then, whether the mode be what we, with our limited outlook, choose to call normal or abnormal, does not, I think, matter very much. If it weaves us into the whole, if it convicts of sin and compels to disinterested action; then we may regard it as the genuine and authoritative development of that dim instinct for Reality which is latent in every soul.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

## THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE*

IF we assume that apologetics can make good the legitimacy of the view that religious experience depends on contact with a God who is in some sense personal, and if we turn to the problems involved in the attempt to base on that experience particular doctrines, whether fundamental to Christianity or secondary, it is, I believe, necessary to introduce from the start two distinctions—namely, the distinction between particular beliefs and the resulting mental attitudes; and, secondly, the distinction between the subjective and the objective conditionment of experience by belief.

In regard to the former distinction I would illustrate what I mean by the case of worship. I would call *worship* a mental attitude—so also love or penitence. The importance of making such a distinction between belief and resulting mental attitude lies in the fact, as I believe, that the dependence of a religious experience on a particular belief is not direct, but that there is direct dependence on some mental attitude and that the belief comes in as normally leading to and conditioning the mental attitude. In support of this view I would contend that in so far as there is approximation to a mental attitude—*e.g.*,

* The following notes are extracted from a paper on the argument from religious experience and deal only with certain special problems.

to worship, even in the case of an atheist—there tends to result an experience which approximates to the experience—*e.g.*, of peace and strengthening—which results from theistic worship. Everyone can think of illustrations from particular cases: most of us from our own case. Further, I am inclined to think that when widely different beliefs issue in fairly similar religious experience they are found to involve fairly similar mental attitudes. If this general view is correct, then the place of a religious doctrine is, on the one hand, to explain the existence of a capacity for some mental attitude and the resulting of certain experience from this attitude; and, on the other hand, to lead to the mental attitude in question in its most effectual form.

While it is possible to name certain mental attitudes apart from a direct assertion of particular doctrines or beliefs, I believe that a large part of the problem is complicated by lack of nomenclature for mental attitudes or for modifications of these. It is in this connection especially that Professor Otto seems to me to have given real help in one field. Fortunately, the difficulty can also be met *to some extent* by reference to " the mental attitude corresponding to such and such a belief," or " the change in attitude corresponding to such and such a change in belief." What I am concerned to emphasize is the need for distinguishing between a mental attitude and the doctrine or doctrines by which it is rationalized and which are its normal ground.

On such a view a doctrine has a *prima facie* claim if it does thus indicate and explain opportunities of experience. On the other hand, as has been said, widely different doctrines may do so in particular cases, and the question arises as to the criteria between these. Here it seems to me to be primarily a question of the degree in which such doctrines fit into a coherent system which covers all experience, especially although not only religious experience. I would wish to emphasize a further consideration. Any particular belief or doctrine has a general reaction as well as specific implications. Even if its specific implications tend to be justified, we may find that its general reaction is not. For example, a particular doctrine as to the saints might assist religious experience by making the object of worship seem more real, and yet might have disastrous results in other directions through the conception of God to which it led.

I am, however, already trenching on the second distinction which, as I believe, it is important to make—namely, that between the subjective and objective conditionment of religious experience by belief. In so far, for example, as people found it difficult to think of the world as dependent upon God save in terms of a literal acceptance of some creation narrative, belief

in this narrative would condition that view of God which would produce the fullest experience in meditation, worship, etc. Such conditionment is what I mean by subjective conditionment. It may even arise through mere conservatism. A. B. may have so come to associate belief in God with certain ideas that if these ideas were disproved his belief in God would go, and with it resulting mental attitudes and religious experience.

Clearly such subjective conditionment is not evidential. It is, however, another matter if the conditionment appears to be objective. To stick to the example already used, if we think of the world as dependent on God, our conception of God differs seriously from what it would be if we believed the world not to be so dependent; and *pro tanto* our mental attitude in worship or meditation would be modified. If fuller experience results from one belief rather than another, and if it appears to be the case that the difference turns on an *inevitable* difference in resulting mental attitude (and is not ascribable to conservatism, bad logic, or lack of imagination), then it appears reasonable to hold that there is objective conditionment which supplies a real test of the two beliefs.

In the above I have tried to indicate very briefly certain considerations which appear important in regard to any attempt to argue from religious experience and which raise important issues in regard to any such attempt. It may be of use if I try to illustrate by one or two examples the kind of argument which they appear to render possible.

I will take first the case of idolatry. It is obviously impossible to deny either that genuine religious experience has been mediated by the worship of idols, or that there may quite possibly be stages at which idolatry actually assists rather than hinders such experience. It can, however, be argued that with intellectual and spiritual development the conception of God which is involved is obviously harmful in its general reaction, and that such assistance turns on subjective conditionment, being due to the idol making it easier to think of God as real. That is, however, not the whole story. In so far as one idol is better than another, we may have to deal with objective conditionment. For example, if idols which inspire awe are found to assist worship better than others, it is implied that awe is a right attitude to God. We have also to deal with the fact that some embodiment of God is in certain ways of assistance; and that if an embodiment could be secured which did not lower, but raised, the conception of God, gain would in consequence result. Such a consideration may have relevance in various directions, notably in regard to the Incarnation, since it suggests

as at least possible that if a final religion emerged it would afford such assistance.

Or take relics. Clearly the devotion stimulated, or its good results, are not evidence of the truth of a belief that some relic is, *e.g.*, part of the True Cross. We are obviously dealing again with subjective conditionment; the belief in the relic makes Calvary seem more real. On the other hand, we have to reckon with the fact that objects with suitable associations do thus move men, do make things seem more real; and, while we have no evidence of the genuineness of any particular relic, we may have to recognize that the use of relics (which does not get out of proportion or involve dishonesty) may admit of a sound defence.

Turn to the central problem presented by the doctrine of the Incarnation. A boy, aged six, said to his mother that he never supposed the Gospel stories were true, but thought they were written to show what God was like. That puts very simply the possibility which has to be faced. It might be that the dependence of Christian experience on the belief that our Lord Jesus Christ was very God was due to this belief, making God seem more real, and to the fact that the divine condescension involved and the figure of Jesus in the Gospels do present a good idea of God's nature. Now even if that were all, it would be very much. It can be argued with very great force that it is not only a question of making God seem more real. The resulting conception of God does facilitate the whole gamut of religious experience in a way which cannot well be explained, given our fundamental assumption as to the basis of such experience, unless that conception of God does involve a real improvement. But if we are seeking to discriminate between such a form of modernism and something nearer to traditional belief, *and if we limit ourselves to argument from religious experience*, then what is important is whether extreme modernism does or does not afford the better guide to religious experience, and this must be tested by reference solely to the case of persons who are capable of understanding such a position and who are not unduly prejudiced against it. It may be that on that issue time has still to show. If some more traditional belief holds the ground it will be because no modernist theory, which seeks to explain just how and why the Gospels are "good myth," proves a satisfactory guide to religious experience. If one were concerned to deal with any particular attempt, I should be inclined to look first at the manner in which it interpreted the value which Calvary must be admitted to have had when conceived as an atonement for sin. I am, however, anticipating later issues.

It is necessary to safeguard all that has been said above in

one direction. It is not merely a question of current religious experience: nor is the experience reflected in the New Testament simply the "first chapter" of Christian experience. That experience yielded so rapidly ideas which have proved of such value that in some manner it must have been exceptional and must possess in consequence exceptional significance. We are not yet concerned with the question as to what is involved if this be the case. I am simply concerned to indicate that for such a view as I have tried to suggest the New Testament is normative in a very real sense.

In conclusion, I ought to say briefly how consensus appears to come in on such a view of theology. Here, again, a distinction requires to be drawn between the significance of a doctrine as a chart to experience and as an explanation. In so far as a doctrine has proved a good guide to religious experience, and owes its vitality to that cause, then *whether or not it is an adequate rationalisation any adequate theory must cover the experience and the conditionment of experience which it has served to indicate.* The irreducible element in any doctrine lies in consequence in the capacity which it has displayed as a guide to experience; and, speaking generally, it is difficult to deny that such a capacity has been displayed when a doctrine, which closely affects devotional life, is widespread and persistent in any religion or religions. If Christianity is in fact the most advanced religion, this will be especially the case within Christianity.

Important as this is, it is, however, very far removed from the assumption that a doctrine as currently believed should be held true because it has great devotional value. A true doctrine must explain the experience and conditionment of experience indicated by the original doctrine. The original doctrine has, however, only a claim to full acceptance in so far as adequate consideration and reconsideration, by thought which is not unduly prejudiced, finds in it the best explanation. Even so, we have to recognize and make allowance for the partial and symbolic character of all our knowledge of God. The beliefs of saints —and of common people—may afford the best test of the value of a doctrine as a guide to experience. The judgment of competent theologians must be the test of its value as an explanation. In both directions, and especially in the latter direction, the importance of *free* consensus is too obvious to require development; but it is no less the case that theological thought is only reliable when it has full regard to the conditionment of religious experience which is evidenced by widespread doctrines or beliefs however intellectually inadequate.

In the above I have tried to indicate the place and value of consensus in supplying authority for particular beliefs. I turn

to the relation of this authority to the authority of the Bible, or of some great prophet, or even of our Lord's teaching. In each of these cases (as indeed also in the case of the Church) there is an intuitive judgment of the type, "Thou hast the words of eternal life. . . ." Such a judgment is in no way to be discounted either by the fact that it is essentially practical or by the fact that in general it is occasioned at least in part by a sense that the source of teaching, which is in question, has proved amazingly illuminating in some particular field. On the other hand, consensus is fundamental in a very real sense. It is not a question of whether or not a doctrine, which is supported by consensus however wide, is to be regarded as more likely to be right than a doctrine taught, say, by our Lord. It is a question of the *immediacy* of the rational authority in the two cases.

The fact that we can rationally give authority to our Lord's teaching on the strength of an intuitive judgment involves and derives from consensus in two directions. In the first place the weight to be attached to any such intuitive judgment is much increased if the judgment is felt to be valid by a large proportion of those persons who might be expected to judge most correctly in such a matter. In the second place, the judgment turns very largely on something which is guaranteed and must be guaranteed by consensus—namely, that the teaching ascribed to our Lord (including as not least important teaching which implies a mediatorial capacity) has been found to be true in so far as it can be checked in wide and varied experience. We do not, in fact, rest on an intuitive judgment apart from such partial verification, but base the intuitive judgment at least in part on a greater or less, a general or individual, verification in experience of His teaching. The judgment has in consequence a rational ground which is greatly augmented by wide verification.

Further, nothing is more certain than that all intuitive judgments, which ascribe authority, are apt to be too absolute. An infallibility is apt to be ascribed which proves to be excessive, or at the very least to be wrongly interpreted and applied. When we pass from judgments of the type, "Thou hast the words of eternal life . . ." to the exact nature and extent of the guarantee which this affords of particular statements, the only adequate criteria are provided by the extent to which and the limits within which experience has verified other teaching which has the same source.

I have taken the extreme case of our Lord's teaching. It is obvious that what has been said applies with even greater force to those other sources to which we may be moved to ascribe authority. What is important is the recognition on the one hand that any such authority rests on consensus for its verification

and in consequence for its rational defence, but on the other hand that the insight or inspiration which is thus verified and defended is antecedent to, independent of, and more fundamental than systematic argument from consensus. Such insight or inspiration can only be adequately accounted for and can only adequately express its claim by some such phrase as "Thus saith the Lord." That claim must, however, be made good, and its implications evaluated, by the test of experience and, therefore, by an appeal to experience and so to consensus. With the view which we are led to take of particular claims this paper is not directly concerned.

WILL SPENS.

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## SOME IDEALS OF CHURCH AUTHORITY*

BEFORE we proceed to discuss the authority of a particular "group" or organized society—namely, the Christian Church—it will be well to state in outline, and so, somewhat dogmatically, the assumptions that we make about the nature of authority. We suggest that authority has two aspects—a philosophical and a psychological—though these are most closely connected. Philosophically, authority goes back to the belief in absolute values, goodness, truth, beauty, and the like, which make an unconditional claim upon us. We find them and do not make them. We are under an obligation to pursue them for their own sake. In this sense, wherever and however perceived, they claim authority over us. Further, we believe that they are grounded in the being of God Himself and that in the last resort their authority is His authority. But though they have an objective existence and claim authority over not simply this man or that man, but all men, their full apprehension transcends the capacity and experience of any single human mind however gifted. The experience of the individual needs to be enlarged by the experience of others. In other words, psychologically, the idea of authority rests on a belief in the social nature of reason and conscience. The claim of any society to educate and control the mind of its members in fulfilment of the purpose for which it exists rests on the conviction that it represents a collective wisdom and insight based on a wider experience. It should not, indeed, desire to supersede or repress the reason

* The bulk of this paper was composed to be read at a meeting of the Anglican Fellowship recently held in Oxford. It was originally designed to follow papers on the psychological and philosophical nature of authority. This explains the form in which the subject is presented. The treatment throughout aims at setting out the ideal rather than the actual; what ought to be rather than what is.

and conscience of the individual. Rather, authority aims at leading the individual to verify for himself the truth that at first lies outside the range of his own experience. Ideally, the group mind and purpose is a richer and more balanced expression of the divine purpose than any individual mind, and so may rightly claim to control the individual life not in order to absorb or abolish its individuality, but to integrate it into the life of the whole, in which alone it can find its true fulfilment. The individual mind can only come to itself under the authority of the group mind, and the authority of the group mind depends on its larger and fuller apprehension of those ultimate values in which alone human effort can find satisfaction.

Is, then, the authority of the Church only a particular instance of the authority that the group exercises over its members? Psychologically it is hard to find any real ground of distinction. The peculiar characteristics of the authority of the Church spring from the special nature of the Church itself and the purpose for which it exists.

If, then, we consider the Church as a group, how does it differ from other groups? Many sociologists distinguish between "thought organizations" and "will organizations" —that is, between those which exist for the pursuit of knowledge and those which exist to get something done. The Church cannot be contained in either of these two classes. It would more adequately be called a life organization. The group that comes nearest to it in the width of its aims is the family. The Church exists in the world to promote a certain kind of life. The Christian, in the words of the New Testament, is "a new creation"; he has been "born again."

Elsewhere we find the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" groups. Again, neither of these titles really comprehends the Church. It would claim to fall into a class of its own and to be in some sense a "supernatural" group. It owes its existence to a special act of God; its life is sustained by a special and conscious relation to God through faith, and this supernatural strain runs through its whole structure. If we regard the Church as a *supernatural life group*, we perhaps get as near to a definition for our present purpose as we are likely to get.

The Church did not begin as a society for discussion or research. It was not formed by a number of men in order to seek for truth. It came into being to proclaim good news and to exhibit a life based on a concrete revelation from God. It was to be the witness to the world of what it had seen and heard and proved the worth of. It started from something given. The Church's gospel may be summed up as "the fact of Christ."

It centres not in a body of doctrine or a code of morals, but in a Person. We may take as a typical statement the opening words of the First Epistle of St. John:

"That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the word of life (and the life was manifested and we have seen and bear witness and declare unto you the life—the eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us); that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us; yea, and our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son, Jesus Christ."

Such a passage brings out what authority meant to the apostolic Church. The gospel that it proclaims contains a nucleus of historic fact. It bears witness to certain happenings in space and time. It asks that these shall be accepted on the authority of those who saw and heard them. It appeals to the testimony of eye-witnesses. Unless we are prepared to eliminate all historical elements from Christianity and to change it into a religion of mere ideas, the authority of the Church on these points will always be indispensable. For our knowledge of past events we are necessarily dependent on authority. Take, for instance, the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth as a historical fact. We cannot verify for ourselves the actual occurrence of this event or of the details of it by any analysis of our inner consciousness. We are dependent on the evidence of others. We may rightly test that evidence. Historical facts can only be proved by historical evidence, and no particular historical event can ever be proved logically to have happened. All knowledge of the past rests on faith—faith in the truthfulness and competence of the witnesses. In the case of the alleged historical events comprised in the Christian Gospel all that we are entitled to demand is that the evidence is good and the character of the witnesses such as to command confidence. We cannot get rid of authority. Many of us would be prepared to maintain that the full moral and spiritual value of the Cross depends on the fact that it did actually happen, that Jesus did actually endure death in the manner and in the spirit described in the Gospels. For our knowledge of this we rely on the authority of the Church. We have in the New Testament the testimony of the first disciples and those who heard them, and behind the writers stands the witness of the primitive community approving their record as correct. We are bound to test that record by the laws of historical criticism, but we can never dispense with authority.

But the Gospel has never been a mere recital of historical

facts or a bare chronicle of events. It has always included some interpretation of those events. The Church has always preached the meaning and value of the historical facts to which it bore witness. Thus Jesus of Nazareth was from the first preached as no mere prophet or teacher, but as the Messiah, as the Son of God, or as the Lord. His Cross was no mere martyrdom, no cutting short of a life of beneficent activity, but an act of redemption and as such consummated by the Resurrection. In all this is a very large element of interpretation and reflection. If we ask on what it was based, the answer must be the experience of the first Christians, the impression made by Jesus on His first disciples, the power of His teaching, His mighty works, and, above all, the Resurrection. The terms in which they spoke of what He was and what He had done were but the attempt to put into language all that was implied in the attitude that they were taking up towards Him. Jesus Himself had invited them to think out who He was, and His language about Himself raised many questionings which were stimulated by the historical facts of the Cross and the Resurrection. In other words, the primitive Christian interpretation of the facts of the Gospel was based on what we may call a series of moral and "numinous" judgments. It was an attempt to understand more fully a profound moral and spiritual experience.

Further, the Church never regarded the activity of Jesus as ceasing with His death or His ascension. Whatever difficulties there may be in the account of Pentecost or the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, it is plain that the Christian community felt itself to have undergone a profound spiritual transformation. The evidence for this was no passing feeling, but a permanent uplift to new levels of life, a new capacity for courage and fellowship and love, the production and perpetuation of a specifically Christian type of character such as the world had never seen before. Here were strange phenomena that demanded an explanation. And the early Church unanimously gave as an explanation those beliefs which find classical expression in the pages of the New Testament and which constitute the Gospel. A belief in God the Father who had sent His Son Jesus to reveal Him and to reconcile men to Him by His death, and a belief in Jesus as a living Saviour dwelling in the Church as His body through the Holy Spirit. Further, the Church held that all men might share in this new life by accepting Jesus as Lord and entering into its fellowship. Thus this new life involved certain intellectual presuppositions. These were subordinate, but were always there. Christianity was a way of life based on a Gospel. This Gospel, including both historical facts and interpretation of those facts, was in the first instance accepted on authority,

but it carried with it increasingly its own verification by the satisfaction of their moral and spiritual needs that it brought to those who accepted it and the new life that they enjoyed in the fellowship of the Church. As the Church spread the scope of the witness of the Church widened. Many who had never known Christ in the flesh were now able to bear testimony to what He was still doing through the Holy Spirit in the membership of His Body. The Gospel was found to contain in itself ever fresh possibilities. The "riches of Christ" were being explored. And here we may note a difference between the Church and other groups. The question has been raised whether in the case of organized groups we can in any real sense speak of a group "consciousness" as well as a group mind. The evidence does not seem to justify the ascription of consciousness to a group apart from its members. But in the case of the Church we find in St. Paul and St. John the idea of Christ as the true Group self, realizing Himself and finding His fulfilment in the development of His body. In other words, the Christian Church has always claimed authority not only as witnessing to a revelation in the past and pointing man to a redemption once achieved, but as being indwelt through the Holy Spirit by Christ Himself and as being the organ of His present self-manifestation to the world.

As the life and activity of the Church developed, new questions were asked and new answers had to be given. Partly these were theological—questions concerning the interpretation of this or that belief. Explanations were given by teachers which conflicted with one another. So the Church was compelled to play the part not only of witness, but of judge, to decide between contradictory explanations and to rule out speculations which explained away the truths by which the Church lived. We must insist that in the development of doctrine in the early centuries the Church never speculated for the sake of speculation. The development of its teaching and the employment of technical terms in which to express it were necessitated by the rise of teaching which would have undermined its whole life and worship. Through controversy it claimed to attain not so much to new truth as to a clearer understanding of what it had meant all the time. Similar problems arose on questions of morality and to a less degree of worship. For our present purpose it is sufficient to point out that the Church's methods of employing its authority in settling these disputes are simply illustrations of the right inherent in any group to control and direct by corporate action and guidance the activities of its members in fulfilment of the group purpose. The fact that it is a supernatural group does not affect the psychological aspects

of its working. Here as always the supernatural works through the natural. It does not supersede or abolish the natural, but perfects it.

Two points deserve notice. The Church always regarded its authority as limited and controlled by the divine revelation historically given in Christ, and the Gospel which it was commissioned to preach was held to be contained in all its essentials in the New Testament. No doubt this needed to be interpreted and applied to new situations, but the New Testament was always treated as a norm by which all later developments should be tested. In this there was no idea of a conflict between two centres of authority. Rather the books of the New Testament were a transcript of Christian experience in the first years of the Church's own life. Apart from the unique position of the writers as witnesses to historical fact, these books were deposited by the Christian society as a first and representative expression of its own life. They embody the reaction of the earliest generation of believers to the fact of Christ under conditions which could never be repeated. If we accept the truth of a historical revelation and hold that God has given in Christ the fullest possible revelation of Himself in terms of human life, then it is the highest practical wisdom for Christianity to accept this first living and creative expression of itself as the measure of all subsequent self-expressions. Thus the authority of the New Testament is the authority of the Church's own experience under unique conditions, which can never occur again.

Secondly, in all its deliberations the Church claimed to depend not merely on collective human wisdom and insight, but to be guided by the Holy Spirit. "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us," is the claim implied in all its corporate decisions, though, indeed, such guidance was always received through reason and conscience and not in any mechanical way.

Here we are faced with the question, Does not this assertion of the divine authority of the Church imply a claim to infallibility? This does not at all follow. All divine guidance is conditioned by moral faithfulness, and this is true of societies no less than of individuals. What Christ promised to His Church was not infallibility, but an infallible Guide, the Holy Spirit who "shall lead you into all truth." In the case of individuals, unless we are Calvinists, we agree that divine grace can be received in vain and resisted. If we deny the Calvinist view of grace as applied to the individual, there is no reason for accepting it as applied to the Church. In other words, only a Church that was perfectly holy, perfectly free from moral and spiritual evil and of unblemished faith, could claim to be infallible, as being completely responsive to the Holy Spirit. When has the

Church been able to make such a claim ? This does not impair the authority of the Church. We all acknowledge the authority of conscience, but this does not carry with it any belief that conscience is automatically infallible. Our power of moral insight and judgment depends on faithfulness to light already received and on purity of heart and life. Both in the case of conscience and in the case of the Church, we find not so much a power of giving final and infallible decisions as a power of self-correction, a faculty for discerning whether we are travelling in the right direction, often, indeed, warning us off wrong paths rather than giving us immediate and precise direction about the right path.

Nor, again, does this view of the authority of the Church give us ground for fearing that there are no certainties, that the whole life and teaching of the Church may be one ghastly mistake. The longer that any decision of the Church has continued to win acceptance and to form a basis for Christian devotion and sanctity, the more probable it is that it corresponds to the mind of Christ. We should hold that the decrees of General Councils depend for their authority not simply on the numbers or learning of those present, but on the later reception of those decrees by the Church as a whole. It is reasonable to believe that God will never leave the Church to remain in error, but will ceaselessly strive, so far as is possible without violating human free will, to enable the Church to amend wrong decisions and correct faulty judgments, by raising up faithful teachers with insight and power to discern and commend the truth. The process may take long, but in the end truth will prevail.

We venture to suggest that some of the dffiiculties which Evangelicals feel about assigning due weight to the authority of the Church are due to the fact that they import into their thoughts about the authority of the Church a view of authority which they have discarded in their thoughts about the Bible. Under pressure of criticism they have abandoned the idea of an infallible Bible, not without regret. But they tend to suppose that the authority claimed for the Church is that of a like infallibility; that a decision of the Church demands to be regarded with the same uncritical veneration as that formerly accorded to a proof text. And they see that history is inconsistent with the truth of any such claim. The true answer to their difficulties lies in a revision of their conception of the idea of authority. At its highest it gives us not a mechanical infallibility, but an overwhelming moral certainty. It leaves room for the exercise of faith and reason.

For, indeed, the difficulties connected with the exercise of its authority by the Church proceed in large measure from the many-sidedness of its life. Its authority resides in the body

as a whole. All classes have their contribution to make to the mind of the whole, not only ecclesiastics and theologians, but saints and mystics and even the ordinary Christian. It is not always easy to collect their verdicts or to integrate them into one whole, since they do not all speak the same language and some of them are delivered in act and conduct rather than in word and argument. Thus a saint, *qua* saint, is not in the least qualified to give his opinion on a question of literary criticism or theological definition. Yet he may rightly demur to any teaching that appears to destroy the spiritual values on which his life rests. The theologian needs to be reminded that for a sound theology far more is required than intellectual acuteness or great learning. Moral and spiritual issues are at stake, and no solution can be regarded as satisfactory that does not form a sound basis for Christian devotion and living. Many doctrines that once won the commendation of the official world have passed into oblivion because they proved themselves to be of no value for the Christian life. They have not been disproved; they have only been forgotten. The question is sometimes put in the form, Has the Church authority for theology, or only for religion ? Is this authority based on a consensus of experience or only of reflection on experience ? The answer is that both are required in their measure. A sound religion and a sound theology are both required, and in the long run neither can endure apart from the other. The fundamental Christian experience is a personal relation to Christ, and the knowledge involved is that of a person which makes demands on the whole man.

Ideally there should be no conflict between the authority of the Church and the reason and conscience of the individual, but in practice we know that there often is, and that the fault is not always on one side. In the last resort the belief of the individual must depend on his own reason and conscience, the faculties with which God has endowed him for discovering truth. If a man has honestly taken pains to understand the teaching of the Church, and after prayer and thought finds himself unable to give assent to some part of its teaching, then he must be prepared not only to hold, but to act on what he believes to be right. Christ did not shrink from appealing to men to think and to choose. He asked for faith as opposed not to reason, but to sight. Personal responsibility for belief cannot be shifted on to the shoulders of others. Even those who hand over their mind and conscience to an infallible Church must at least make an initial decision.

To put it shortly, we hold that an individual has a right to his judgments, but not to his prejudices. The right to form an

opinion carries with it the duty of making the moral and intellectual effort to form a correct one. Mere rebellion against authority is foolish. Since in all departments authority stands for a wider experience and an ampler wisdom, a man should differ from the authority of the Church with regret and hesitation. He may be right, but the odds are that he is wrong. It is true that reformers and discoverers of new or neglected aspects of truth have often been condemned by the official voice of the Church and had to endure persecution, and only slowly have their views prevailed. But, on the other hand, persecuted prophets are quite a few as compared with fanatical and eccentric teachers who were rightly rejected by the Church, and posterity has endorsed its verdict. Was there ever a crank that did not hold himself to be a prophet? Religious authority is naturally conservative. This is not without its advantages. If the Church was slow to welcome the new light brought by Darwin, it has at least turned a deaf ear to the futilities of the Anglo-Israelites.

Why, then, is there to-day such a revolt against the very idea of authority in religion? The reasons for this are partly good and partly bad. No one can deny that at times the Church, acting through its representatives, has used its authority wrongly and oppressively. Partly it has tried to extend it to fields that it does not really cover. There is no reason to believe that the Church has any special authority to decide on matters of fact outside those contained in the original revelation to which it exists to bear witness, or in the field of science. Its authority is moral and spiritual. Other departments are the provinces of other groups. Christians who are members of those groups show their Christianity by bringing with them into the group life a sincere desire for truth and a readiness to take infinite pains to get it, not by bringing ready-made theories and claiming that they have been divinely revealed. Of course, the Church rightly refuses to accept philosophies and scientific theories which are flatly inconsistent with its own life—*e.g.*, that deny the existence of God or the possibility of sin; and it does this in the name of reason because it is sure that one piece of truth cannot contradict another. The nemesis of past attempts, however excusable, to extend the authority of the Church into provinces that do not belong to it is not far to seek. When men see that new knowledge has disproved doctrines which were taught in the name of the Church and for which it claimed divine authority, they reject not only them, but all the doctrines of the Church. So its rightful authority in matters of faith and devotion is weakened.

Again, Church authority has been impaired by being misused

by official teachers and leaders. The group life suffers as a result of the sins of its individual members. Men have failed to resist the temptation to invoke the authority of the Church for doctrines and practices that really had not the authority of the Church at all. They have forgotten that infallibility is not one of the gifts conferred by ordination. An appeal to the authority of the Church has been used as a short cut to silence opponents or to save the trouble of thinking. Others have enforced Church discipline and regulations and even beliefs, by methods entirely alien to the spirit of Christ. They have resorted to force and to the very means which Christ Himself rejected in the Third Temptation. Thus the moral and spiritual authority of the Church as resting on a free consensus of faithful men has been undermined. Authority has been militarized in order to produce visible and immediate results. The methods of the drill sergeant have replaced those of the apostles. It has been used not "to build up," but to keep down. Lastly, the Church has been secularized and, owing to various forms of human sin, the moral and spiritual witness of its life has been obscured. The Church and the world have become confused, so that the unique attractiveness of the Christian life and its distinctiveness from the merely natural life have been dimmed. The bulk of Christians do not seem very different from everybody else, Christian beliefs do not seem to affect their practice, and so the authority of the Church is reduced to a mere shade.

I would end by urging that what above all is needed to-day is a revival and strengthening of Church authority, purged and renewed. We are learning increasingly that advance in any direction is only possible by organized corporate action; that the individual can only grow into his true self as a member of a group. Yet in religion we are drifting into a lawless individualism. To-day the great danger is not that new ideas should be suppressed or prophets persecuted. The danger is all the other way—that unity of witness and worship should be destroyed. It is utterly false to suppose that in religion authority makes great claims, while in other departments of life the individual is entirely free from its control. On the contrary, in science a man starts from authority, all his life he takes a large proportion of his beliefs on authority, and indeed without such a use of authority no advance would be possible. The same is true in its own way of art. In ordinary life not even the youngest of us claims to be omniscient. Why, in religion alone, should we suppose that we can dispense without loss with the accumulated and formulated experience of others? Further, the Christian life is not solely or even primarily intellectual. The right moral dispositions, Christian tastes and habits, can only be acquired and

practised in a Christian environment and under Christian influences. So, too, worship and prayer need to be learnt. Our latent capacities can only be drawn out and developed by being given the opportunity of sharing in worship. The authority of the Church is to be found in the life of Christian righteousness and love and in the fellowship of Christian worship not one bit less than in, say, the Creeds. We need it in all these ways if we are to grow to our full Christian stature. Those who have experience of parish work know the sore need of authority and guidance in religious life, thought, and practice displayed by the ordinary man and woman. At present they are bewildered by the lack of authority in our Church. Those who lead mainly academic lives seem sometimes cruelly indifferent to this urgent practical problem. For the average man will always have to take a large part of his religious belief and practice on authority. He can prove its value as a basis for life, but has neither the time nor the capacity to examine for himself its full historical and theological foundation. I am not in the least advocating obscurantism. We should always be ready to explain to people the grounds of our belief and practice and their source in Scripture. But I still maintain that there is no work more needed among men and women of goodwill than to concentrate on central Christian truths and to reinforce the Church's authority in proclaiming them.

Our religion began with authority at our mother's knee. It has been built up in an atmosphere maintained by authority. Its continuance and progress in the world depend not on the attempt to abolish authority, but on its right use.

E. J. Bicknell.

# MISCELLANEA

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

Both the November and December numbers of Theology have brought us a considerable amount of correspondence, of which we print an instalment this month. We are glad to print Dr. Coulton's rejoinder to our review of his book, and our readers, who will, we hope, have Dr. Coulton's book before them, must judge for themselves between us. As to his first point, we confess at once to a *lapsus calami*, which we think must have been clear to all. Dr. Coulton is quite right in making the correction; but we entirely disagree with his view that the " abstract " is more spiritual and less materialistic than the " concrete." On neither of the other points do we feel disposed to change what we wrote.

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The other letters relate mostly to Father Puller's article on Reservation in one kind, and we shall print some of these next month. We are satisfied that the case as regards custom in antiquity is not so simple as his article suggested.

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We have received a copy of a small collection of *Ember Prayers*, published by the " King's Stone " Press, Long Compton, Shipston-on-Stour, price 2d. each (with reductions for orders of a dozen or upwards). They are compiled by a priest well qualified for the task, and contain a Foreword by Canon Randolph. The devotions take the form of short litany and collects for each day of the week; and are admirably adapted to meet the need felt by many for a better observance of Ember-tide. They have already been authorized for use in church in many dioceses, and will also be found full of suggestions for mental prayer. We trust that they will be widely used.

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## CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,

While thanking you for many kind expressions, may I protest against three cases in which you seem to have mistaken what I hoped were very plain words ?

1. I do not say or imply that the " concrete " is more spiritual and less materialistic than the " abstract." I plainly imply exactly the opposite, and am therefore in complete agreement with you and other people on that point.

2. You single it out, as " a particularly glaring case " of my applying to one age the words of later witnesses, that I cite a thirteenth-century abbot in a chapter in which I am professedly describing " the age immediately preceding St. Benedict." You need only turn to the first pages of that chapter in order to see that this is not so. I there advise readers to realize the other and better side of the period with which I am dealing by reference to ten easily accessible volumes, which range from St. Anselm to Thomas à Kempis. Is it not therefore quite plain that,

in this chapter, I am dealing not only with the pre-Benedictine monk's mind, but with those factors in monastic mentality which are common to all the medieval centuries? I had already brought St. Benedict upon the scene (p. 19); thence I proceed (p. 20) (in words which, again, you entirely overlook) "to consider what religious ideals were logically implied in, *or practically developed by*, this cœnobitic institution." The words there italicized should warn readers plainly that I am surveying the whole development, and therefore quote my thirteenth-century abbot quite as legitimately as I cite the *Imitation;* both alike come quite naturally within the scope of this chapter. An author's only protection against this kind of misconstruction lies in your correspondence column.

3. You twice assume (pp. 242, 244) that I quote unfavourable generalizations to the exclusion of more favourable generalizations from contemporaries. Yet I have frequently said that if I quote these only, it is because I know no others. If you know others which would redress the balance, you have only to give me references, and I will print them. If, on the other hand, like previous critics, you have no references to supply, but are only expressing a general sense of discontent, how then can you justly blame me for not printing that which, so far as you and I know, does not exist at all?

Believe me,
Yours faithfully,
G. G. COULTON.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
*November* 12, 1924.

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DEAR SIR,

I have read with great interest the article in the November THEOLOGY on "The Problem of Pentecost." May I venture on one or two criticisms?

Mr. Dewar seems anxious to assimilate the phenomena of Pentecost to the other New Testament instances of *glossolalia*. But surely Dr. Kirsopp Lake, in his note on *glossolalia* in *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul* (pp. 241 *ff.*) to which Mr. Dewar refers, makes it clear that there are two forms:

1. More or less unintelligible speech, "temporary paraphasia induced by religious emotion" (p. 249 *op. cit.*), with which may be classed the unusual activity and fluency of speech (referred to on p. 248) induced by the same causes.

This was the "normal" New Testament phenomenon.

2. The much rarer cases of speech in foreign languages, such as I believe to have occurred at Pentecost.

Surely the question "How hear we every man in our own tongue?" does not, as Mr. Dewar suggests (p. 254), "more naturally" refer to one language than to many? "If there had been more than one," he says, "we should have expected 'tongues' rather than 'tongue.'"

But the question could not run "How hear we *every* man in our own tongues?" ἕκαστος followed by the enumeration of different nationalities is surely intended to emphasize the fact that many different languages were heard, and ἐν ᾗ ἐγεννήθημεν strengthens this impression. Mr. Rackham (*Acts of the Apostles*, p. 21), though arguing from Mr. Dewar's point of view, is forced to admit that "verses 8 and 11 require that some of the

utterances should, as was natural, have been clothed in foreign words." Were the utterances all in Hebrew, as Mr. Dewar suggests, there would be no point in the enumeration of different nations.

The " tongues which could be interpreted " in the Corinthian Church may doubtless be so explained, but not the account in Acts. A similar instance, besides those referred to by Lake, may be worth quoting.

In the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, part li., December, 1905, is an interesting account of Psychological Aspects of the Welsh Revival, 1904–5, by the Rev. A. T. Fryer. The following is quoted amongst many other accounts of eyewitnesses: " The (to me) most remarkable part of the phenomenon called the Religious Revival was the ecstatic utterances of illiterate young men and young women.

" In St. Mary the Virgin's Church garth between twenty and thirty young people took part in extempore prayer regularly at each service (or after service) for about six weeks. Previous to the Revival not one of these had ever attempted to engage in public extempore prayer, and for the last two months they have all ' relapsed ' into their former state of silence and calmness of mind.

" Their utterances consisted for the most part of Bible and Prayer Book expressions, so arranged and fitted together as to form a coherent and beautifully worded prayer.

" During the short period indicated above I heard dozens of prayers that for piquancy of expression, richness of cadence, and fervency of utterance would have done credit to a St. Chrysostom. And this from the mouths of young folk whose knowledge would hardly be level with the present-day requirements of the fourth standard !" (*op. cit.*, p. 123, *cf.* p. 91).

But surely more than this is required by the account in Acts ? Some years ago, before so far as I know ever seeing the suggestion in print, I formed the opinion that the phenomenon of Pentecost was a case of subconscious memory, and I see that this theory is referred to in Peake's Commentary (p. 648), as well as by Professor Lake, and perhaps in the passage Mr. Dewar quotes from Professor Pratt.

As the latter says, " Jerusalem was a decidedly polyglot community." At Pentecost, especially, there were present Jews from all over the world. To many of these doubtless the language of their adopted country had become as natural as their own Aramaic or the universal Greek.

As they once more walked the streets of the Holy City and gazed at their magnificent Temple—the younger ones perhaps for the first time—they would doubtless " speak the wonderful works of God."

Is it absurd to suggest that many of them may have done so, not in Aramaic or Greek, but in the native languages of their adopted countries ? and that the Apostles may have overheard many such praises of God in foreign languages ? without, of course, understanding them.

But then under the stress of spiritual emotion, and no doubt, as Mr. Dewar suggests, the breakdown of a repression, some of these words and phrases, perhaps whole sentences which had been stored up in the subconscious memory, may well have come out in their ecstatic utterances.

This would explain both the amazement of those who heard their own language and the charge of drunkenness brought by those who did not understand the languages, or heard only a confused jumble of different languages.

To those on the edge of the great crowd of hearers, who were almost out of earshot, and who in any case would have heard only an occasional sentence with any distinctness, the effect of a stray phrase or two in their own language might well be to convey the impression that the whole speech was in that tongue.

Similar cases of subconscious memory are recorded.

There is, for example, the well-known case recorded by Coleridge (I have not the reference) of an ignorant servant girl in Germany, who, when delirious in hospital, uttered long passages of good Hebrew. It was found that she had lived in the house of a clergyman, a Hebrew scholar, who was in the habit of repeating aloud long passages of Hebrew while walking up and down the passage between his study and the kitchen where the maid worked.

In the same part of the *Proceedings of the S.P.R.* above referred to there is an account and discussion of an amazing (if genuine) case of xenoglossy, but it is too complex to attempt to outline here, and I do not know whether any definite conclusion was reached, as my volume is only an old one, and I have not had the opportunity of referring to later ones.

J. H. Adams.

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*To the Editor of* Theology

Dear Sir,

In a note on page 340 in the December number of Theology, you refer to "Professor Turner's allusion to the neglect of the appeal to History in earlier Protestantism," and you specify page 311. I find on reference that Professor Turner is referring to "the dominant Protestantism of the nineteenth century," not to earlier Protestantism. If Milton is an example of what the Professor deplores, it is sufficient to say that "one swallow does not make a summer." The English Elizabethan divines, like Hooker, Jewell, and others, were Protestant in the historic sense of the word, and they with many of their contemporaries were constant in their appeal to history. I do not think that the same could be denied of Calvin and Melanchthon. On page 306 Professor Turner does, without note of time, say "that the Protestant rigidly limited his historical appeal to . . . the New Testament," but, as stated, this was an appeal to *history* (see the opening of the article "Our Appeal to History"). I believe it can be shown that even the limitation of the appeal to the New Testament was not so rigid as the article would imply—that is, in the case both of the Early English and Foreign Reformers. It is a *fashion* to say so, or to think so, in some quarters, but it is not, I believe, historical.

Yours faithfully,

F. McKenzie.

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## STUDIES IN TEXTS

*Numbers* xxii. 23: "The ass saw the angel of the Lord standing in the way, with his sword drawn in his hand."

Can a twentieth-century sermon be profitably preached on Balaam's ass? I think so. The talking animal, like the serpent in the Garden, is folk-lore. But the story of an animal that was open to spiritual

influences, and detected the presence of something other-worldly before its master, starts a train of thought which is quite up-to-date.

Otto's book *The Idea of the Holy* has attracted much attention in its English translation (see Professor Taylor's review in THEOLOGY, March, 1924). His main idea is that the "numinous" (a word coined to express the thought, since "awful" will no longer stand the strain, and "eerie," "uncanny," etc., only express part of his meaning) is an essential part of religion. This sense of something beyond our usual experience, which awes and fascinates us, is practically universal.

Principal Oman, reviewing Otto in the April number of the *Journal of Theological Studies*, discusses the sense of the numinous in animals and tells the following story:

"When a boy of fourteen or thereabouts, I was riding through the Standing Stones of Stenness on a winter afternoon when dusk was settling into darkness. They stand on the top of a lone narrow neck of land between two lochs. The close-cropped heather crackled under my horse's feet, the loch on the right was still shining under the glow of sunset and the loch on the left was darkness almost to blackness, and across a bay the gravestones in the churchyard stood white and clear over it. The circle of stones had a look of ancient giants against the grey sky, and the gaping mounds which had been opened stood shadowy and apart. A more numinous scene, at a more numinous hour, could not be found on earth. And the feeling which suddenly struck me is not inaptly described as the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. But at the same moment it struck my old horse at least as vehemently as myself. He threw up his head, snorted, set his feet, trembled, and finally bolted at a rate I should have thought impossible for his old bones."

The reviewer very pertinently remarks that "the feeling had probably not yet arrived at being religious for my horse, and had ceased to be religious for me." But this does not affect our point. If a sense of the uncanny passed over boy and man at the same time, then it can fairly be correlated with those "complex emotions" which McDougall has analyzed so acutely in chapter v. of his *Social Psychology*. Much of the noblest aspiration and achievement of humanity is the result of the sublimation of innate emotions shared with animals and presumably traceable to our pre-human ancestors. Some writers trace the origin of religion to reflection on dreams. Others connect it with the sex instinct. If we can fairly call religion the sublimation of that sense of the beyond, the uncanny, which the higher animals possess, then it is absolutely fundamental in humanity, has been there from the first and will be there till the end.

I suggest that an educated congregation can be suitably introduced to such a train of thought by the story of Balaam's ass; probably a village congregation, so much more familiar with animals than a town one, could appreciate a good deal of it. The Commentaries do not seem to make this precise point. Thus G. B. Gray in the *International Critical Commentary* says: "Apologetic interpreters . . . sought to establish the credibility of this particular instance by an appeal to the fact that irrational animals have 'a much keener presentiment of many natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, storms,' etc., than man, and possess a power of clairvoyance." This is true enough, but misses the point I have tried to bring out.

W. K. L. C.

## DR. HANS LIETZMANN

It may be of interest to readers of Theology to know something about the distinguished scholar who has succeeded to the Professorship held for so many years by Professor von Harnack, who in his old age is still lecturing as an Emeritus Professor, and busy with a new edition of his book on Marcion.

Dr. Lietzmann was born in 1875, and studied in the Universities of Jena and Bonn, becoming a Doctor of Theology and Philology. For a time he taught Classics, and his well-known edition of the writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea, as well as his famous series of "Little Texts," which includes Classical as well as Theological texts, shows the strength of his classical scholarship. He has also published *Specimina codicum Græcorum Vaticorum* and an edition of the *Gregorian Sacramentary*. He is editor of *Die Zeitschrift für neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft*, and of a popular series of New Testament Commentaries.

Those who appreciate the skill with which he uses various kinds of type in the Little Texts, and the printing of Creed-forms in a remarkable article on the early history of the Apostles' Creed, will be interested to hear that at an early stage he took his printers into partnership by lectures of our University Extension type, and interested them in the subject-matter of the writings which they were setting up. He has always been interested in all sorts of scientific apparatus, beautiful Zeiss binocular glasses for deciphering MSS., a camera for photographing them, a Zeiss telescope for astronomical studies. He has a large collection of slides illustrating the history of Christian Art, and in his Institute at Berlin has entered with joy into the inheritance of a former Professor Müller, who was one of those people who collect and do not write. His students have at their disposal a well-appointed library, and a large collection of casts of sarcophagi and antiquities of many kinds, also a beautiful model of a catacomb. The lecture-room has a fine electric lantern, which can be switched off and on from the lecturer's desk.

His studies have led him more and more to the subject of Liturgiology. One of his chief interests is the editing of Sources. He is a great admirer of the publications of the Bradshaw Society, for he realizes how much remains to be done in the editing of texts before we can arrive at conclusions on many disputed questions.

In his book *Peter and Paul in Rome*, published in 1915, he maintained "the view that a translation of the relics of Peter and Paul to the Catacumbæ—that is, to the site of the later basilica of San Sebastiano—took place on June 29, 258." He has recently visited Rome to inspect the new excavations in preparation for a new edition of that book.*

His Handbook to the New Testament, which includes the Commentaries referred to above, begins with a New Testament grammar, and a most interesting volume by Dr. P. Wendland, *The Hellenistic-Roman Culture in its Relations to Judaism and Christianity*, to which Dr. Lietzmann has himself contributed an appendix containing beautiful illustrations with descriptions, including the Arch of Titus, specimens of Hellenistic Art in Portraiture, Monuments of the Cult of Mithra, etc. The theological position of this volume is, as we should say, frankly modernist, a survey

* See also his article "The Tomb of the Apostles Ad Catacumbas" in the *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. xvi., No. 2, April, 1923.

of the origins of Christianity by a writer who does not believe in the possibility of miracles, whose view on the essence of Christianity is expressed in the following sentences:

"The piety which Jesus taught and lived before men points to the greatest simplification and deepest inner experience of religion. The real essence of religion is created out of the immediate experience of inward fellowship with God, and in opposition to Pharisaic piety developed into the illuminating simple and clear sentences which seem to stream out from the harmonious unity of His personality."

In a word, we are to believe in God as Jesus did, but to think of Jesus as inspired indeed, but not the Incarnate Son of God in the sense of the Creeds. This being the keynote of the series, we may expect to find in Dr. Lietzmann's own contributions, commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, a complete set of references to writers such as Norden, Bossuet, Reitzenstein, who regard the teaching of St. Paul as influenced at many points by current Hellenistic thought.

In an excursus on 1 Cor. x. 22 Dr. Lietzmann writes, with reference to Cult-meals: "He who has learnt to think historically in the sphere of religion will probably hold here also, as in connection with Baptism (exc. to Rom. vi. 3), the influence of Hellenistic Mysticism on Gentile Christianity."

Again, on 1 Cor. xiii.: "The wonderfully beautiful 'High Song of Love' is for the historian the most striking evidence for an estimate of the importance of the Apostle Paul in the history of the world, because it opens out to us the deepest insight into the essence of his religious temperament. In the forms in which he presents his teaching, and in a great part of his experience Paul is fully a man of the old world, who was limited by Jewish and Greek influences. But in spite of that he most clearly laid hold of the ethical-religious value of the Religion of Jesus, and recognized in it the kernel and goal of the Christian life."

But students who cannot agree with this "Liberal Theology" may derive much benefit from these Commentaries. For they will find an excellent translation of the Greek into modern German, sound scholarship in the discussion of the text, and a wide knowledge of all recent discoveries of inscriptions and archæological enquiries which may throw light on its meaning. The authorities are quoted accurately, and there is no question of the religious earnestness of the author. It is of the utmost importance in these days that we should learn more through the comparative study of religion to which Dr. Lietzmann and his school invite us. But no knowledge of the environment in which our Lord and His Apostle lived and worked, however profound, will release us from the responsibility of facing the mystery of His Person and of responding to the question: "Whom say ye that I am?"

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## CHURCH LIFE AND WORK IN WESTERN CANADA

In starting work in the West after parish work in England, life seems to be contrast piled on contrast. Except on the coast there are no city parishes like those in the Old Country. Between the Rockies and the coast there is hardly a town with more than one parish.

One had all one's life been used to the dignified services of the English parish church, with its beautiful singing, and everything to help to uplift. Then one Sunday morning one arrived at a tiny settlement of

less than fifty people, right in the mountains, many miles west of the Rockies. There is no church—simply a log school—no organ, no choir, no altar, nothing but everyday school equipment. And perhaps, worst of all, on Saturday night there had been a dance in the school, which had not even been swept out. On the floor were burnt matches, cigarette ends, orange peel, and a pile of other rubbish. What a shock for a priest accustomed to going to church a few minutes before service time and finding everything ready! It meant turning to, with the help of a friendly settler, sweeping up, and trying to turn the school into a temporary church. Then we found there was not even a table. So for an altar we had to use the wood box, and with equipment one had carried ten miles we soon had quite a respectable church.

Another contrast! At home most priests live very near the church. Out here a priest often travels several miles to church. Sometimes he is away for the week-end, or frequently has services on week-days. Often he has to walk, *e.g.*, eight miles, row about a mile across a lake, then walk another mile before Sunday morning service. And in these cases it nearly always means another long walk or ride to some other settlement, as there are seldom two services in one day in these tiny places. One has frequently to walk twenty miles a day, though this is nothing to what the early pioneers did. Sometimes we travel on horseback, spending the whole day in the saddle; or by train, motor boat, lake steamer, and one has spent many a weary hour on an old steam tug up and down the lakes of this beautiful country.

In one's travels one has either no companions or strange ones. Many weary miles are covered without a sign of a living being. At other times one meets foreigners of all kinds, including Indians and a "peculiar people" of Russian extraction called Doukhobours. These people wear a very picturesque native costume. Sometimes as a protest against what they feel to be unjust laws they will appear in large numbers without any clothing. On one occasion I remember seeing one of these men on a train, and he had a kind of crown made of oranges. Considerable amusement was caused, as every one who got on the train wanted to buy the oranges. He always refused, for, he said, "How can a king sell his crown?"

Though there are none of the hardships of early days, life is very strenuous for a man who is missionary-hearted and loves his flock. During Easter week I conducted services in eight places covering a district—through lakes and over mountains—eighty miles from north to south. Nor are there any real dangers. I have only once seen a bear; one day I was within 10 yards of a coyote (wolf); and at one settlement a cougar (panther) 6 feet 6 inches long had been killed a few days before my arrival.

Once more, it is much harder for people to get to church. There are no servants to do the housework. Life is very primitive, which means more work. In rural districts it is hard to get a living. There are very few good well-worked farms as in England; people are just wresting a farm from the virgin forest, and it is no easy matter felling trees and clearing land for a living. In these districts there is no coal; we burn wood from the forest, and for twelve months I felled, hauled, and sawed all our own wood. So with the laity the hard work tends to kill things spiritual. The people's time is very fully occupied, and Sundays are often spent in repairing harness, fences, and doing many other chores. Then one cannot always go for services on Sundays; half the services are held on week-days. So difficulties arise when it comes to teaching or

preparation for confirmation. Perhaps on arrival the people are picking small fruit which, being perishable, must be dealt with at once. So they cannot leave their work—there is no question, it must be done—and you have other places to visit on that trip, so cannot wait. So you do the best you can in, say, ten or fifteen minutes, and visit them again on another trip.

In visiting a settlement *all* people must be seen. This means many weary miles of tramping. Every likely-looking trail has to be explored. One feels like a boy scout again, watching the tracks, looking for signs of life, whether they be matches, cigarette ends, or a partly eaten apple. In the organized districts this is not so difficult, but in the unorganized settlements it is really "prospecting," and becomes something in the nature of a great adventure. One goes on not knowing where the trail leads to, or where the next meal is coming from, or even where one will sleep. On one occasion I remember walking a long time up a mountain trail, and though there were signs of life no house was visible. I decided to go on until twelve noon, and then turn back. Later I found that had I gone 200 yards further I should have reached a dwelling. But I returned to the road, and took another trail. At 1.30 p.m. I reached another house, and was gladly welcomed, but was told that all the dinner was eaten. In spite of that, in about fifteen minutes I was having quite a good dinner of pickled meat, canned fruit, and tea!

There is the very gravest danger of these settlers getting right out of touch, and having no desire for the higher life. In one lonely settlement I have a few good friends. It came about in this way. Whilst spending a week-end in a certain district, I heard of a settlement ten miles north which a wandering evangelist had recently visited. He was told that the Gospel was not wanted, but that if he had a pack of cards in his pocket he would be welcome. I borrowed a horse and rig, and set off the ten miles to visit these people, and saw every soul in the place. The next day I drove over again, and seventeen of the thirty-one residents turned up to a cottage service. No priest had visited this place for seven years, many of the children had never heard of Jesus, and wondered who the funny man was who fastened his collar the wrong way round, talked to them of someone of whom they had never heard, and, strangest of all, put on a long black garment, and then a white one over it. Truly there are many souls in the land of darkness. Recently I visited another place where no priest had been seen for fifteen years. No one is to blame—the few men we have cannot cover the ground.

The Anglican Church has a wonderful opportunity. Perhaps it is because of English tradition that we are welcomed everywhere in a way in which no one else is. It also seems true that we cover the ground better than others; but what a lot more we ought to do! We are hindered, God's work is suffering, through our lack of men and money, though our people do wonderfully well. In a parish of ten tiny settlements, with a total population of less than 800 (all denominations and many nationalities), we raised £300 last year, and most of our people are poor ranchers.

And there is wonderful material with which to build a real Catholic Church. We have English, Canadian, Dutch, German, Austrian, Swiss, and many others. Generally speaking, they have no ministers, so our responsibility is great. All the children attend the same day schools, and come to us for religious teaching. What an opportunity to build a real Catholic Church for the future! Then, in a new country like this there are many companies of "peculiars." In Kootenay we have two such

sects—the Mennonites, a people of German extraction, and the Doukhobours, who originally came from Russia. These have their own religious observances. The latter may need our care. They are something like the Quakers, but live a community life. These people are now beginning to imitate the manner of living and the customs of the other settlers, and it looks in many ways as if the break-up of the community will come before many years. Many families have already broken away, and when they leave the community they do not keep up their religious observances. Their children then attend the ordinary school and our Sunday School, and will soon become absorbed into the nation. As a community they never can become absorbed. So here we have more material for the great Catholic Church.

At the present time the ministry of the West is largely from England. We need a native ministry; we must, in time, "grow our own men." But this will be a very long process, and in the meantime we need the best of the younger clergy from home. We must have, not the misfits but the best. What the "Canadian Kipling" says of workers for the Yukon is true of all the West:

> This is the law of the Yukon, and ever she makes it plain;
> Send not your foolish and feeble; send me your strong and your sane.
> Strong for the red rage of battle; sane, for I harry them sore;
> Send me men girt for the combat, men who are grit to the core;
> Swift as the panther in triumph, fierce as the bear in defeat;
> Sired of a bulldog parent, steeled in the furnace heat.
> Send me the best of your breeding, lend me your chosen ones;
> Them will I take to my bosom, them will I call my sons;
> Them will I gild with my treasures, them will I glut with my meat;
> But the others . . . the misfits, the failures . . . I trample under my feet.

We need and must have, if we are to build well and truly, men with a very high standard of personal life; with a strong sense of duty; determined that God's work must come first; willing to adapt themselves to a new and in many ways a strange country; willing to deny themselves many lawful things lest they cause a weaker brother to stumble. These are vital matters to-day, as the forces of evil are very powerful. Our priests to-day must be real men of GOD.

Here, then, is a great opportunity for young Anglo-Catholic priests. One's heart glows as one reads of the wonderful congresses with their love and enthusiasm. It does one good to hear of the great processions and the priests walking four abreast. Ah! but it would do one much more good if some of these young stalwarts would come out here. They would have to be willing to do much patient spade work. They would miss the congresses, the processions, the beautiful adjuncts to worship. But they would be building up the Kingdom in a wonderful way, and if they are true to their profession they must come overseas, where the true lover of souls will find

> There are souls to rescue,
> There are souls to save.

England would not suffer; she would benefit by the sacrifice these young priests should make.

This naturally leads on to another urgent question—candidates for the Sacred Ministry. My firm belief is that there is no shortage of men. It is simply that men cannot afford the training. Out here it is a much simpler matter. The cost of training is considerably less. Many of the college terms are in the winter, and men can work through the summer, either at ordinary work or on missionary duty, and usually earn enough

to see them through the next college year. Lack of money need not keep a man back out here. I would like to appeal to my brother priests to make this quite clear to their lads and young men, and if I can be of any use I am gladly at their service.

That the need of men is great is proved by the Canadian Primate's recent synod charge, in which he says: "When the leaders of the Church are overwhelmed with the desire to go out, and send out, to meet this need —especially in the lonely, isolated, and scattered settlements of our Province—they are met with what seems to them just now an insuperable difficulty, in a veritable dearth of living agents to send forth. In the ecclesiastical province of Rupertsland, including the diocese of Algoma, there is an estimated shortage of 200." In this connection it is important to bear in mind that this does not refer to what we call curates, but to incumbents, and that incumbents nearly always have several places under their care. I have had twelve, varying in population from 32,000. Nor can neighbouring priests help much. We are so far apart, and each one has more than he can do.

The diocese of Kootenay is as big as Great Britain. There are only twenty-six priests working in the diocese. We are always wanting men, and as we get more men we can develop new districts.

Here is still another contrast. In England all the people are within reasonable reach of the Sacraments. As far as actual churches are concerned, here they are few and far between. In one district there is a church, the next is thirty miles away, again thirty, then forty-nine and seventy-two. It is no easy matter for people to get to church in these cases, so we have to go to the people. For this we must have men.

This also means that the priests themselves are isolated. When I first came West from England my nearest priest neighbour was forty-nine miles away, and in winter, if we wanted to see each other, it meant a trip of 200 miles, as we were frozen in. In the south my nearest neighbour was sixty miles away. Now one feels much less lonely, as I have a neighbour between six and seven miles away.

In England a priest holds a position of some authority by virtue of his office. Out here the slogan is "Jack's as good as his master." The priest is tried and proved in many ways before he is given much respect.

I have not touched on the priest's financial position. Generally, we love our work well enough for that question to take a back seat, but in the West clerical poverty is practically, if not altogether, unknown. We do not have money to waste, but we have sufficient to enable us to live the simple life our calling demands.

Many of our people out here live very lonely, isolated lives. Radio and similar inventions are brightening things somewhat, but they need the Bread of Life. To give them the Bread of Life we must have men. Men willing to follow their Master in sacrifice and service will find in this great young country every opportunity they desire.

I complete this article on Canadian Dominion Day, as all our people are celebrating the anniversary of the formation of the Dominion. And we who love our Lord and His flock pray for the time when—

Our prairies and our mountains,
Forest and fertile field,
Our rivers, lakes and mountains,
To Christ shall tribute yield.

CHRISTOPHER E. TURNER.

## THE ODES OF SOLOMON

A FURTHER SELECTION RENDERED INTO ENGLISH VERSE, WITH SUGGESTED TUNES, BY S. P. T. PRIDEAUX, D.D.

(NOTE.—It is thought by some scholars that these beautiful and rapturous odes were sung at the Baptism of Catechumens in the early Church, and it is with the same object in view that these translations have been attempted; simplicity and directness have consequently been a guiding principle rather than literary effect.

The translator wishes to express his grateful thanks to the most Rev. J. H. Bernard, D.D., Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, and the Rev. J. Rendel Harris, D.D., for their kind and courteous permission to use their translations and editions.)

### XV.

#### JOY

JOY like the sun to the watcher for morning,
So is the Lord both my joy and my sun,
Summoning me with the light of His dawning,
Darkness dispelling, a new day begun.

Eyes hath He given me with holy revealing,
Ears became mine and His truth have I heard;
Thought hath He quickened, all knowledge unsealing,
And I have found pure delight in His Word.

Lo! at His call have I error forsaken,
He is my path and Himself is the goal;
Bounty ungrudged from His Hand have I taken,
Richest salvation received for my soul.

Beauty excelling is mine and I die not—
Deathless is life in the land of the Lord;
All who are faithful—He saith—and I lie not—
Fully and freely shall have their reward.

Tune, E.H., Appendix, 9: Epiphany.

### XXXV.

#### PEACE

In quietness His dew
The Lord distilled on me,
And o'er my head a cloud of peace
Kept guard continually.

The earth and heaven did shake
And smoke at His behest
In fear and judgment, yet I found
In His commandment rest.

Ah! more than shelter He,
More than foundation stone;
His dew was as a mother's milk,
His arms a mother's own.

His bounty made me great;
Redeemed He set me right;
With hands and soul upraised I knew
Rest in His perfect height.

Tune, E.H., 236: Carlisle.

## XXXVI.

### Rest

I rested on the Spirit of the Lord;
He made me stand and set me up on high;
I saw the glory of His Perfect Self:
I made a song to praise Him worthily.

In His Presence received I heavenly birth,
Tho' but a man was placed among God's sons,
Among the enlightened; praised Him with His choir;
And great was I among His mighty ones.

According to His greatness so He wrought,
According to His newness made me new;
Anointed me from His own perfect store,
As close companion to His side I drew.

Then like a cloud of dew my voice broke forth,
And from my heart a stream of righteousness;
In peace I can approach Him; all my ways
His spirit governs and establishes.

Tune, A.M., New Ed., 1904, 533: Shiplake.

## IX.

### The Open Ear

Open your ears and I will speak with you;
Give me your souls and I will give you mine.
The Lord's good pleasure 'tis to give you life,
Perfect, eternal, in His Son divine.

Be rich in God the Father and His Word;
Be strong, ye saints, redeemèd by His grace;
I cry you peace, that none in war shall fall,
And those who know Him never lose His Face.

Blessed are they who set upon their heads
Of Truth the everlasting diadem;
Great is its price and men have fought for it,
And righteousness has given it to them.

Put on your crown in His true covenant,
The names of those who conquer in the strife
Shall written be within His holy Book
Who wills you shall have victory and life.

Tune, E.H., 438: Song 22.

## XXXIV.

### The Simple Heart

No way is hard to those of simple heart,
Nor can a wound assault the upright mind;
No storm can shatter the enlightened thought;
Where Beauty reigns all harmony I find.

Earth and the things of earth but shadows are,
The imaginings of those who do not know;
All truth's above; and grace salvation brings
That ye may live and all His praises show.

Tune, E.H., 307—The Sacred Heart; A.M., 2nd supplement, 761: St. Agnes.

## REVIEWS

ESSAYS IN EARLY CHRISTIAN HISTORY. By E. T. Merrill, LL.D. Macmillan and Co. 15s.

Dr. Merrill represents himself as a "classicist," and claims as such to be exempt from the blinding partiality which obscures the historical vision even of our most eminent theologians. The supercilious tone in which this book is written from beginning to end will seriously diminish its influence among students in this country, who are familiar with the scholarly equipment and broad outlook with which the early Christian literature has been treated by commentators and historians like Lightfoot and Gwatkin. Indeed, these essays might well have been left unnoticed, had they not been supposed by some reviewers to have seriously shaken the ground on which the authenticity of the First Epistle of Clement of Rome has been almost universally accepted. It needs little knowledge of Early Church History to understand the chaos which would result if this important document were discredited and thrown into the second century after the manner of the now almost forgotten "Tübingen School."

The essayist's argument on this topic runs somewhat as follows: Hermas says that the Aged Woman who appeared to him in a vision bade him write two booklets: "One shalt thou send to Clement, and one to Graptè; Clement shall send to the foreign cities—for this duty is committed to him—and Graptè shall admonish the widows and orphans; but thou shalt read it unto this city with the presbyters who preside over the church."

As the *Shepherd* of Hermas is dated *c.* 140—that being the beginning of the rule of Pius, the brother of Hermas (in whose episcopate, according to the Muratorian fragment, Hermas wrote his book)—Clement, whose duty it was to communicate with outside churches, must have been the foreign secretary at that time.

The Epistle of the Romans to the Corinthians, said by Dionysius of Corinth to have been sent "through Clement," cannot therefore be much earlier than this date. Indeed, when we read it with this clue we are led to place it about this period. And we are confirmed in this by finding that Hermas never makes the least allusion to this remarkable document, which he could not have passed over in silence if he had known of it.

Who, then, was the Clement who appears in the Roman

episcopal lists as the second or third successor to the Apostles? The answer is: "The reputed bishop Clement probably never had an actual existence."

I do not claim to have done justice to the argument of the "classicist" by this scant summary. I merely record the impression left on my mind after reading what he says. Every point which he has raised has been dealt with by Lightfoot in his two great volumes on Clement of Rome, or more recently by Harnack in his *Chronology*. It is enough here to remind the reader that there is an alternative interpretation of the evidence, and to urge that before accepting the essayist's presentation of it he should study the arguments of these capable critics.

Two remarks I may, however, offer to those who are not fully equipped for so great a controversy. The first is that the reconsideration of Lightfoot's argument for *c.* 96 as the date of the Epistle leaves me confident that it cannot be set aside by such counter-arguments as the essayist has brought forward. And, be it noted, Lightfoot deals with the date first of all, apart from the question of authorship. Of the latter he even says: "It is not a very momentous question. The historical value of the document will remain for the most part unaffected, now that we have ascertained that it was written during the last decade of the first century and with the authority of the Roman Church, whoever may have been the actual author."

The second remark will illustrate the danger which "the unprejudiced classicist" runs when he makes confident affirmations in regard to a literature with which he has no familiar acquaintance. The argument on which our essayist insists again and again is that Hermas must have shown traces of the Epistle if it were a document well-known in the Church of Rome in his day. But this argument would equally prove that St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans themselves was then unwritten or unknown; and the same may be said of almost any book of the New Testament, except the Epistle of St. James, the language of which (though he never makes a direct quotation) permeates the whole of his work. Hermas writes as a prophet: his message comes to him direct, and not through the writings of others. The only quotation he ever makes is from the Book of Eldad and Modad, prophets like himself. Therefore this argument will not affect our decision.

It is hard to be patient in dealing with a book of this kind, especially when we remember the massive learning which has been brought to bear upon the subject in the past. The writer's style is almost as unattractive as his temper. Two specimens may suffice:

Not only have modern writers assumed altogether unwarrantably the existence of such definite and accurate oral tradition as they desiderated, but they have also fondly imagined that the Churches must have had from the beginning local records and "archives" in which the more important events in their experience were set down, and which, therefore, served as a basis for such later appearing statements as would otherwise arouse in our minds natural suspicion of their being due to mere invention or illegitimate inference (p. 14).

What modern writers (we may ask in passing) can be referred to here?

Wherever the Roman power extends, there is the apocalypt's Rome (p. 117).

What is an "apocalypt"? Where did "the dismayed classicist" of the page before meet with this strange phenomenon?

The last essay may perhaps give us the key to the book. It consists of sixty pages devoted to "St. Peter and the Church of Rome." The writer seeks to destroy the ecclesiastical claim of the Roman Church by showing that St. Peter never came to Rome at all. The controversy is an old one, of course: the new contribution is the investigation of the episcopal list which Hegesippus must have made for himself and for the Roman Church of his day, to bring it into line with the Churches which he had already visited and in which he had found lists existing already. "To Hegesippus, then, and to Hegesippus only, is due the inception of the fable that made St. Peter a founder of the Church in Rome." We need not pursue the topic here: for again we are able to refer the reader to a discussion of it which will probably suffice. In the last days of his life Bishop Lightfoot was engaged on a dissertation on "St. Peter at Rome," the final section of which was never completed; the dissertation is printed at the end of the second volume of his *Clement of Rome* (ed. 1890). We can well understand that to clear the way for his crowning thesis our essayist found it desirable to depress the date and to discredit the authorship of St. Clement's Epistle, and even to regard the first-century Clement as a mere invention of Hegesippus.

J. Armitage Robinson.

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## PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

The Psychology of Religion. By W. B. Selbie. Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.

The Modern Churchman. September, 1924. Blackwell, 3s. 6d.

Religious Experience. The Baird Lecture for 1924. By R. H. Fisher. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

Dr. Selbie's book is the first of a new series to be published under the general editorship of the Bishop of Gloucester. The author is Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion, and the volume before us is learned and comprehensive just where we should expect it to be so, on the ethnological side. The author rightly insists on the importance for his subject of "the worship, habits and folklore of primitive peoples, and the literary records of all the great religions of the world," and in discussing such subjects as cult, prayer, and the belief in immortality makes full and illuminating use of his wide knowledge in these fields. *The Psychology of Religion* inevitably challenges comparison with Pratt's great book, *The Religious Consciousness:* the ground covered is largely the same, and both authors approach their subject from a detached and scientific point of view. We do not think Dr. Selbie's book can be held to have superseded Professor Pratt's; and in at least two directions it seems to us distinctly less valuable. Professor Pratt in his preface speaks of his "increased insight into the inner nature of Roman Catholicism," for which he is indebted to his wife: it is when he is describing such things as Mysticism and Confession (in the "ecclesiastical" sense) that Dr. Selbie, on the other hand, is least sympathetic and acute. Nowhere does he consider it necessary to discuss the Eucharist, though he has a chapter on "Cult and Worship" and another on "Prayer": in the course of the latter he himself remarks that "it is an entire mistake to confine our investigation of these religious phenomena to its less developed forms"! Several times in the course of the book one expects a reference to Otto's *The Idea of the Holy:* it is only mentioned once, in a footnote on p. 94, though then under its German title, which would seem to suggest familiarity with it.

With the more strictly psychological aspects of the book we confess to feeling gravely disappointed. In a work of this size and importance it is not unreasonable to expect that current thought and investigation as to the nature and functions of the mind should be considered, in their bearing on the problems of the religious consciousness, with some approach to thoroughness. We might have expected, for example, some fuller examination of such important conceptions as those of intra-psychical conflict, rationalization and repression; and we may reasonably be surprised to find that a good deal of the author's writing about the Unconscious seems somewhat confused. It is by no means clear in what precise sense he himself understands the term, though he considers it (quite rightly, in our judgment) of sufficient importance to devote a chapter to "The Unconscious in Religious Experience," in

which reference is made to the views of Myers, James, Bergson, Ward, Rivers, Freud, Sanday and others, though there is no mention of the important conception (from the point of view of the psychology of religion) of the "collective Unconscious" developed by Jung in his *Psychological Types*. It is of great importance to recognize, what Dr. Selbie fails to make sufficiently clear, that the current conception of the Unconscious is to this extent at least strictly scientific, that it is an inference from empirically observed facts—not all of them, as Dr. Selbie more than once suggests, derived from the records of mental pathology—and that it has little or nothing in common with the "supraliminal consciousness" of Myers or even the "subconsciousness" of James. Dr. Selbie's last chapter is on "Religion and the New Psychology": the value he attaches to what is, surely, that psychology's supreme contribution to our knowledge of the mind may perhaps be judged by this astonishing sentence: *In all of them* (*i.e.*, in emotion, intellect and will) *subconscious influences co-operate, but the rôle they play is a subordinate one save in cases which can only be classed as morbid.*

The paper on *Psychology and Religion* read by Dr. Hadfield at the Modern Churchmen's Conference in August last, while it is as lucid and delightful to read as the rest of this writer's work, has nevertheless, we venture to think, some of the defects of its qualities. The parallel suggested by the present (apparent) collision between psychology and religion and that of a generation ago between biology and religion is obvious—up to a point: but we think it breaks down precisely at the point where Dr. Hadfield presses it. He suggests that just as the doctrine of evolution has "changed our conception of the way in which God works, without affecting our belief in God," so it will be with modern psychology. The illustration he offers is that of prayer: from its obvious affinities with auto-suggestion he apparently concludes that the strength we receive in prayer "comes from within ourselves," and goes on to urge that religion is saved, so to speak, by asking, "but where (ultimately) does that strength come from? . . . We may now say that in prayer, *instead of* God working from the outside, so to speak, God works through the human soul."* The italics are ours. We are bound to say that we are inclined to regard this doctrine of prayer as something less than Christian. Certainly, if and when it is generally held, men will cease to pray. We have no space to comment on the rest of Dr. Hadfield's paper, except

* *Cf.* "*Instead of* thinking of God as working from the outside and creating the world as an Artificer, we think of God as working from the inside; that is to say, working through nature" (p. 333, italics ours).

to say that he seems to us to emphasize the human side of religion in such a way as to make the final result nine parts faith and one part Grace. Nor do we quite understand how a Christian can be "not prepared to give an opinion as to whether Christianity is the final religion or not."

Dr. Fisher's Baird Lecture is almost wholly homilectic. The only detailed references to psychology are in the first chapter, and it would have been better to have omitted these: few people at this time of day are likely to be impressed by the description of Freud's doctrines as "insane maunderings." A volume of more than three hundred pages, which in the year 1924 contrives to discuss at length such subjects as Prayer, Sacraments and Mysticism, with little or no indication that psychology has a very great deal to say about them, is something of an achievement.

CYRIL E. HUDSON.

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A HANDBOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY. By Anthony Koch, D.D., adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss. Vols. iv. and v. B. Herder Book Company. Vol. iv. (1921), 10s. 6d.; vol. v. (1924), 12s. 6d.

We welcome the completion of this comprehensive book (of which the earlier volumes were reviewed in THEOLOGY on their appearance) with genuine gratitude. Two features which marked the beginning of the series are as noticeable, if not more noticeable, in these last volumes as in the first three. They are its cheapness and its readability. Vol. iv. contains 430 pages; vol. v. (which is indeed almost too bulky for comfortable handling) is a vast book of 625 pages; but their prices to the English reader are no more than 10s. 6d. and 12s. 6d. respectively. The three first volumes being cheaper still, the complete work can thus be procured for about two pounds; and as the volumes can be bought separately, it is possible for anyone to acquire, at all events over the course of a year or two, a comprehensive English treatment of the whole subject. We have dwelt upon this financial aspect of the matter because of the degree to which it weighs upon the clergy. But the other aspect is even more important. A refreshing absence of technicality, a free but simple style, continual excursions into interesting points of history, and extracts (many of them specially happy) from devotional or expository writers—all these, taken in conjunction with the large type and pleasant format of the volumes, make them delightful reading. At the same time the priest who wishes for practical guidance in

the direction of souls without too deep discussion of the underlying theories will find the book marked by a "sanctified common sense" invaluable for the purposes both of public and private exhortation and instruction. The conditions contemplated by the writer are, of course, the civilization and institutions of the United States rather than those of England; this, however, adds to its interest for the English reader without in any way detracting from its usefulness.

Dr. Koch is, as he himself avowed in his first volume, and as we noticed at the time, no casuist; common sense, not dialectic, is his guide. He mentions, indeed, many of the questions which casuistry has handled, but contents himself with giving the most obviously Christian answer, without straining out gnats, or enquiring as to the niceties, what may be "allowed" in extreme or unusual circumstances. We may instance, for example, his treatment of the duty of attending divine worship in vol. iii., or that of lying in vol. iv. He ignores entirely any attempt, in the first case, to delimit the exact distance in yards from the church within which the bystander can be said to have heard mass; in the second matter, there is not a hint of the nauseating equivocations about "mental reservation" which in the past have degraded not a little moral theology. Indeed, Dr. Koch sets, in this chapter on lying, a very high and Christian standard; and his denial that the immorality of a lie is wholly dependent upon the harm which it may do is very timely. The true objection to a lie, as he points out with emphasis, is not utilitarian; the Christian moralist is and must be a rigorist on this point simply because lying violates both the true dignity of the man who utters it, and the obligation of charity towards his neighbours. It is an expression of contempt, both for oneself and for others; a holding cheap of the sanctities of human intercourse.

The combination of sanity, reticence, and idealism shown in the discussion of lying is more than paralleled in the chapters on Marriage. There is a restraint in the discussion of "birth-control" which might well be emulated by other writers; and although the section on the social emancipation of women has an old-fashioned air, in that it treats as a still open question what has been for almost a generation an established fact, the discussions of family relationships as a whole are finely conceived. Similarly, the responsibilities of citizenship are treated in a way which will fully commend itself; although the passage on the payment of taxes (vol. v., p. 449) quoted from Dr. Regan may perhaps be thought a little lower in tone than could be wished, such paragraphs as that on the "higher patriotism" (*ib.*, pp. 566*ff.*) are of extraordinary value. In a book of

American origin it is odd to find the problem of Prohibition apparently ignored. There are, of course, sections in the book which strike curiously on Anglican minds; the tirade against cremation (vol. v., pp. 197*ff.*) is perhaps the most remarkable. But in general we have no hesitation in saying that these two volumes (which deals, as we should have noticed earlier, with "Duty towards God" and "Duty towards one's neighbour" respectively) reveal Roman Catholic moral theology in its most charitable, most laudable, and most practical form. The Anglican will, of course, have to adapt them to his own needs, but he will be delighted (and perhaps a little surprised) to find how little real adaptation they require.

K. E. Kirk.

## NOTICES

Love Songs of Sion. A Selection of Devotional Verse from Old English Sources, adapted by Nevile Watts. Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 5s.

The distinctive note of English devotional verse is that of sacred intimacy with the Saviour, often expressing in homely phrase the tender *abandon* which exalts the emotion of the lover. Mr. Nevile Watts has considerably advanced our acquaintance with such lyrics by his selection, edited with care and accuracy. He need be under no apprehension of "impertinence" as to his delicately executed task of modernizing spelling and metre, since comparison shows he has never allowed his touch to modify the original sense of the lines.

At the risk of seeming ingratitude we could wish he had thought fit to include in his selection more examples from Richard Rolle, especially the incomparable *Loving Song to Jesus* from the Thornton MS., and the *Song to Jesus and Mary in the Passion* from the Cambridge MS. The *Hymn to the Blessed Trinity and our Lady*, also omitted, is important on account of its fine note of dignity. Only seven stanzas out of the original thirty-five from the Lambeth MS. *Love of Jesus* are given us here. It would be a great boon to have the whole of this exquisite and characteristic poem reproduced in modern English. We mention these omissions because our gratitude at least includes "a sense of favours to come." The line drawings by Mr. Wilfred Pippet for the *Symbols of the Passion* are a welcome improvement on the crude woodcuts that so often accompany this poem.

The thesis of Mr. Watts' Introduction, that anonymous verse most truly represents the soul of a people, is interesting and has much to its credit in certain periods, as, *e.g.*, that of the Ballads and Moralities from which Mr. Watts has chiefly culled his examples. But we believe it to be a thesis difficult to sustain in times nearer to our own, and we altogether depart from Mr. Watts's judgment that the names of Wesley, Keble and Francis Thompson "speak neither for nor from the heart of England." Of the last name it is perhaps early to speak with decision, but it is difficult to recall lyrics that express the "heart of England" as do "Jesu, Lover of my soul," and "New every morning is the love." And to these we might add others by Ken, Bunyan, Byrom, Lyte and Bonar.

T. J. Hardy.

DU BOSE AS A PROPHET OF UNITY. A series of lectures on the Du Bose Foundation delivered at the University of the South. By J. O. F. Murray, D.D. S.P.C.K., 1924. 4s. 6d. net.

It was in 1906 or 1907 and in the pages of the *Expositor* that Dr. Sanday brought the name and the theology of Dr. Du Boss prominently to the notice of English students of dogmatics. But it is probably true, as the Master of Selwyn comments and deplores, that this remarkable American thinker is not as well known as he ought to be, though, as the Master suggests, the reasons for this comparative neglect are intelligible. Du Boss was as thoroughgoing and consistent a thinker as any theologian of his time, but he was also, both in thought and expression, decidedly exacting, and to read him meant a continual wrestle with the most difficult problems of Christology and soteriology. Dr. Murray admirably describes him as a "prophet of unity," for the unification of the world with God through the Logos in the various stages of His activity was the end which for Du Bose gave the one adequate explanation of the world-movement. So for him Christian doctrine was a closely knit system of truth, revealing in its great outstanding articles of faith in the Incarnation and Atonement and Resurrection of Jesus Christ a progressive measure of approach towards world-salvation.

Dr. Murray takes us step by step through this theology. He is rightly generous with his quotations. I wish he had been rather more generous with his own interpretations and elucidations of difficulties which almost any reader of Du Bose is bound to feel. For Du Bose presents this problem: he was whole-heartedly on the side of the Church in its repudiation of various Christological heresies, and in its positive expression of orthodoxy; and yet his own position seems at times to depend upon or to involve a doctrinal point of view not easily reconcilable with that orthodoxy. His volume on the Ecumenical Councils is most valuable as a continual justification of the Church's action; but whether his idea of "generic" as something over and above "particular" incarnation, and of that destiny when "all men will be Christ, will be taken up into the universal divine personal humanity of Christ and all will be one, losing in individual differences all they have gained in personal comprehension and agreement," is really on a line with the Church's creed, is at least open to question. Du Bose was no pantheist; he believed passionately in our Lord's true Deity and in His atoning work; but the student of him is not unlikely to feel at times like a climber whom a guide leads by a route uncomfortably near the edges of precipices. And, to refer to one specific point, it would have been well to describe more fully Du Bose's contact with, and differences from, the soteriology of such a work as Dale's *Atonement*. Both in this respect and in its exegesis of St. Paul *The Gospel according to St. Paul* deserves careful attention.

But the Master of Selwyn could not do everything. Incidentally he has given extremely full analyses of his eight lectures. And what he has done in the spirit of such *pietas* should bear fruit in increased attention to one who was a great doctor in theological science.

J. K. MOZLEY.

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THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE CROSS. A fresh study of the doctrine of the Atonement. By C. J. Cadoux, D.D. Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d.

Dr. Cadoux's work falls, as a whole, within the class of "moral influence" theories of the Atonement. At the same time it is marked by

two special emphases; one is that no difference in kind can be shown to belong to the saving power of the death of Jesus as compared with that of His disciples who have also given themselves to a martyr's death; the other is that the historical cause of His death was His determination to practise an ethic of absolute non-resistance, which thereby becomes the distinctively Christian ethic. As to the first point, Dr. Cadoux will not deny the existence of a "something more" in the Cross, but he feels unable to say what it may be, and rejects certain ways in which this uniqueness has been described. The notion of a relevance of the Cross to the moral world-order prior to its subjective effect on individuals makes no appeal to him, and he is decidedly depreciatory of ideas drawn from the sacrificial system of the Old Testament. But in the New Testament, the moral imitation of Christ is bound up with a mystical relationship of the believers to Christ who has created a new humanity through His self-donation on behalf of men. This is not simply the first or the highest act of a series, but, however its meaning be expressed, one which neither needs to be repeated nor could be except, *per impossibile*, by one who was as really and completely the Son as was Christ. Concerning the "policy of non-resistance" it is a curious argument that, apart from it, the Cross is unintelligible. The conviction of a mission of redemption through dying does not in itself imply a particular ethic of the kind supported in these pages. What one may allow is that, given Dr. Cadoux's subjectivism, he makes a strong, though not, I think, complete case for his conclusion. The attempt to bring together the Cross and Christian ethics is, in itself, altogether right, and more might be done in this respect with advantages. And the reader who cannot accept Dr. Cadoux's position will find much to respect in the sincerity and seriousness with which they are expounded.

J. K. Mozley.

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Ecce Deus. By H. L. Dixon. Wells Gardner. 7s. 6d.

The author of this book, to which Bishop Robertson contributes an Introduction, desires to supplement Seeley's *Ecce Homo* with a defence of the Deity of our Lord. He writes from a strongly conservative point of view, and his defence of orthodoxy is impaired by his assumption of much which his opponents, and even many who accept his main thesis, will deny. For instance, he assumes the records of our Lord's life in the four Gospels to be historical, and proves from them His Deity, without making any distinction between the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth Gospel, or mentioning the synoptic problem. His attitude towards Holy Scripture generally may be described as pre-critical in practice, if not in theory: on p. 178 he seems to assume that Isa. ix. and Isa. liii. were written by the same person, though on the next page he uses the expression, "the book which bears the name of Daniel."

We cannot, therefore, think that his book is likely to convince a sceptical reader; and it is not written simply enough to serve the purpose of strengthening the faith of the uncritically orthodox.

In his opening chapter he declares his intention of taking in order the different "strands of evidence" for our Lord's Godhead: and after describing the purpose, spirit, and limits of true criticism, and pointing out, with considerable force and truth, the absurdity of the irrational

hatred of theological dogma so common in modern writers, he proceeds to deal with the various articles of the Christian Faith as they bear on the great central truth of the Deity of Christ. He argues that history shows that the world is governed by Divine Providence, and not by arbitrary fate: he shows how St. John the Baptist gave testimony to the claims of Him whose forerunner he was, and how the various writers of the New Testament teach the pre-existence, the incarnation, and the virgin birth of Christ; and he offers evidence that the Fathers of the second century believed in the virgin birth. Next he takes the evidence of our Lord's life, His words, His sinlessness, the relationship to the Father claimed by Him, the history of the Church of the Old and New Covenant and the unique power which its history shows. Then he deals with the evidence from prophecy, maintaining strongly the predictive character of the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament, and with the evidence from miracles, both scriptural and ecclesiastical. Chapters follow on the Death, Resurrection, Ascension, and coming Judgment of Christ, each of which is shown to be a proof of His Godhead, and the book ends with two chapters on the influence of Christ on the world and on the evidence from the experience of the saints. The author's numerous quotations show wide reading: but his general line of thought is more akin to that of a former generation than to that of the present day.

C. B. Moss.

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Introduction to the Old Testament. By Dr. E. Sellin. Translated by W. Montgomery. With an Introduction and a Bibliography for English readers by Professor A. S. Peake. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

Students of Old Testament history in this country, who, for one reason or another, are unable to keep themselves in touch with recent developments of German scholarship, ought to be grateful to Dr. Peake, at whose suggestion this valuable Introduction was translated. Their gratitude should be still further increased by the very illuminating Preface which he has contributed to the volume, as well as by the supplementary Bibliography concerned with English works.

Dr. Sellin is known in this country chiefly, I suppose, as an archæologist, the important excavations which he conducted at Jericho and Taanach having given him a deservedly widespread reputation. His work on the Old Testament has also attracted considerable attention of late years amongst scholars, and in particular the striking and original theory (propounded by him in his volume *Mose*, pp. 81 ff.) that Moses suffered a martyr's death at the hands of his countrymen, and that the well-known figure of the servant of the Lord in the later chapters of Isaiah refers to him.

The present Introduction is a most comprehensive and serviceable work. Beginning with a history of the text of the writings as a whole, it goes on to discuss the date and origin of the individual books; the final chapter is given up to a brief consideration of the growth of the Canon. In addition there are appendices devoted to the Apocryphal books; and the more important of those known as Pseudepigraphal. It will thus be seen that Dr. Sellin has provided most amply for all the needs of the ordinary student.

The general point of view of the Introduction is conservative. This

conservatism is mainly the result of two distinct causes. In the first place, Dr. Sellin has realized that much previous work on the Old Testament has been unsatisfactory on account of the insufficient place given in it to the general environment of the Israelite people. Secondly, he believes, with a growing school in Germany, that eschatology is not limited to the latest phase of the nation's religious development, but that it can be traced in quite early stages. A further characteristic of Dr. Sellin's point of view is the attribution of great importance to liturgical usage as a factor in forming the various books.

I cannot help feeling that Dr. Sellin is right in many of his conclusions, for undoubtedly the present age, through the vast advances which have been made in the studies of comparative religion and folk-lore (though these have been in some quarters unwisely handled) and the revelations of archæology, has at its disposal material which was entirely unknown to Wellhausen, and accordingly some modification of his theories has become necessary. There is, in addition, a reaction in many quarters against what Benedetto Croce terms *philological* history—that is, history whose writers depend on libraries, museums, and archives, but are lacking in real experience of life*—which has not left Old Testament history untouched, and a scholar like Eduard Meyer, coming to it as he does without many of the prejudices of the specialist, is often able to throw fresh light on its problems.† It should, however, be noticed that the criticisms of the Wellhausen school which have arisen in Germany and elsewhere are by no means always in a conservative direction; Eduard Meyer himself is no conservative, neither is Gunkel, nor Hugo Gressmann, the new editor of *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, all of whom have criticized Wellhausen.

Turning to the contents of the Introduction, it seems to me that the strongest part is that which deals with the fascinating and elusive subject of the composition of the Pentateuch. The limits of the problem are carefully traced, previous attempts at a solution are succinctly described, and then what is generally known as the Grafian hypothesis—which in the main Dr. Sellin accepts—is put forward in a slightly restated form.

In regard to the second division of the Canon, the Prophets, a few things call for comment. The multiple authorship of Isaiah is upheld, and the suggestion put forward that Deutero-Isaiah deliberately caused his book to appear under the name of Isaiah, so that we are to see in him "the brilliant last representative of the older prophecy and the pioneer of the later prophetism which wrote anonymously or under a pseudonym." The developments in connection with the criticism of Ezekiel, so long regarded by scholars as a unity, are recorded.‡ Joel is placed after Malachi, but before the Macedonian period.

Coming to the last division of the Canon, an interesting suggestion in regard to Job may be noticed. Nearly all critics consider that the book is not a unity, but that it has received additional material from later writers who wished to make its teaching more in accordance with their

* See especially Croce's stimulating volume, *Theory and History of Historiography*.

† Readers of THEOLOGY will hardly need a reminder of his similar services to New Testament history so brilliantly described in the September number by Mr. Lowther Clarke.

‡ Those who wish for a fuller treatment of this subject will find it in G. A. Cooke's article in *Z.A.W.* for this year (pp. 105 ff.). It is perhaps worth mentioning that *Z.A.W.* is now being conducted as an international organ for Old Testament scholars, and that many of its articles are in English.

several tastes. Dr. Sellin thinks that the apparent want of unity may be due to a repeated working-over of the book *by its original author*. In regard to Daniel, Dr. Sellin considers that the Maccabæan date is "proved to demonstration."

It will be seen from the above notice of the Introduction that although Dr. Sellin is regarded, and quite rightly regarded, as a conservative, he is not unwilling to consider fresh theories and points of view; his Introduction is therefore well fitted for the general reader of the Old Testament who wishes to know the latest developments of the study without being troubled by wild hypotheses.

L. ELLIOTT BINNS.

## BOOK NOTES

*The Challenge of Life.* By L. P. Jacks, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 2s. 6d. These Hibbert Lectures deserve to be widely read. Dr. Jacks is one of our few prophets. Here he proclaims that life is a struggle. Social reform, necessary though it is, solves no problems. "Man was not introduced upon this planet for the sole purpose of not being miserable." The state of things never can be diagnosed nor problems solved. Reformers are hopelessly wrong in aiming at short hours of labour on mass production, redeemed by abundant leisure. Men must be saved through and in their work. It is the message of Ruskin expressed with great persuasiveness in a language our generation can understand. *Men Who Met Jesus.* By F. C. Williams. Longmans. 3s. 6d. Imaginative descriptions of meetings with Jesus on the part of Gospel characters. Thus "the man who followed not with us" is made to say: "I am oversensitive to the influence of personality. I am conscious of good as of the scent of flowers, but, alas! this same power makes me conscious of evil as of an open sewer. This has made life very difficult. I have often felt like a wild bird that is caged in a fœtid court. Thus the beauty and peace of Jesus came upon me as sudden music, or the shock of the first wave when one enters the sea." Professor Turner's Inaugural Lecture of October, 1920, *The Study of the New Testament* (Oxford Press. 5s.), has reached a second edition. We take the opportunity of repeating from the Lecture the literary tasks on which the Professor is engaged, in the hope that his will to finish them may be strengthened by the increase of expectation. It is a formidable list: (i.) A new critical text of Hermas, Latin as well as Greek; (ii.) A History of the Ante-Nicene Church in four volumes; (iii.) A Commentary on the Acts (with Canon Bate); (iv.) A new edition of Cyprian's *Testimonia*. Besides all this he engages to give some of his energy to the Lexicon of Patristic Greek. We have also received from the Oxford Press a very interesting lecture by Professor Turner on *The Early Printed Editions of the Greek Testament* (1s. 6d.). *Ceremonial Pictured in Photographs.* Mowbray. 2s. If the English Use has lost ground of late in "the battle of the Uses," the fault is not that of the Alcuin Club. Their *Directory of Ceremonial* is now supplemented by a companion volume of pictures. No better missionary work could be done for their Cause. The photographs are all attractive, and the grouping of the figures frequently displays rare artistic beauty.

W. K. L. C.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER